Chapter 10: The New Year Newspaper 'Attack' on Over-the-Horizon Radar

Original: Глава 10 «Новогодняя газетная «атака» на ЗГРЛС»

The events of August 1991 are remembered by all Russians, and especially by residents of Moscow. They were covered in considerable detail in the mass media and in books. However, because of the special nature of the military organization of the state, not much is known about what happened during that period in the Armed Forces of the USSR, in the troops themselves, and in various military organizations and structures, especially the central ones. It is likely that further studies will appear about the final days of the famous Main Political Directorate (GLÁVPUR) of the Soviet Army and Navy. The older generation knows well what role the powerful party-political hierarchy, managed from the center by GLÁVPUR, played in the troops. Its leaders were necessarily members of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The head of GLÁVPUR reported directly to the Central Committee and Politburo and was independent in decisions on his department even from the minister of defense.

During that extremely difficult period in the history of the state, our journal "Communist of the Armed Forces" also suffered. Toward the end of August, the editor-in-chief, Major General Koshelev, called me into his office and ordered me to go to the airbase in the Moscow suburb of Kubinka. There, he said, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Colonel General Petр Deynekin, was holding a reception for foreign military attachés and journalists. The editor-in-chief told me to ask the commander-in-chief a couple of questions about military aviation if I got the chance, and to watch him carefully. The true purpose of this assignment became clear only in Kubinka itself. At the time, I simply wanted to get away in the good weather to the nearby Moscow region and visit the famous Kubinka airbase once again.

At the appointed time, several buses with journalists departed from the main headquarters of the Air Force, which was located at that time in an impressive building on Bolshaya Pirogovskaya Street in the capital, heading for the airbase in Kubinka. We arrived quite quickly. On the Mozhaisk highway on a late August morning in 1991, there was not the traffic congestion that exists now. And in Kubinka, we were met with a real celebration. First, the numerous foreign military attachés and journalists were invited to a special viewing stand. From there, we had a good view of demonstration flights of combat and transport aircraft and helicopters. Between flights, journalists surrounded the new commander. That's when I managed to ask Petr Stepanovich my first question about the prospects for the development of the Air Force. The commander, himself a professional military pilot, spoke quite sensibly about his vision for the development of combat aviation.

After the flights, a lengthy press conference took place. Colonel General Petр Deynekin answered many questions in a relaxed manner, including those related to the August events in Moscow. I asked the colonel general a second question at that point. I mentioned which publication I represented. And the commander-in-chief answered it as well. After the press conference, the commander invited all the journalists to one of the nearby aircraft hangars to celebrate his appointment in a relaxed atmosphere. While we were walking to the hangar, a familiar female journalist from the First Television Channel from Ostankino took me by the arm and confided that my question at the press conference, and indeed my very presence, was more than inappropriate. She said that the journal "KVS" was odious and that sanctions were being prepared against it. After this brief conversation and her advice to look for work at another publication, I understood why I had been sent to this event in Kubinka. Apparently, the editor-in-chief wanted to see how the new Air Force commander—who had supported Boris Yeltsin in August 1991 and joined his team—would react, not to the questions themselves, but rather to the very fact of the presence in Kubinka of a journalist from "KVS." However, the commander, who had known me since 1989, responded benevolently to the questions of a major from the central journal being dissolved by GLÁVPUR.

Upon returning to the capital from Kubinka, I immediately went to the editorial office. Without stopping at my department, I went directly to the editor-in-chief's office to tell him about the television journalist's words and about the reception itself. On General Koshelev's desk and on the floor stood several cardboard boxes. Nikolai Aleksandrovich was placing papers and books into them. He nodded at my greeting and continued with the boxes. Then, as if remembering something, he looked at me questioningly. Without waiting for him to ask, I immediately told him about the event, about what Deynekin had personally said—that he would cooperate with our journal—and only after that did I relay the television journalist's information. General Koshelev looked at me darkly and attentively, then said that he was being removed from his position and the fate of the journal itself was still unknown. My report had clearly come too late.

However, the journal survived August 1991. It was merely renamed to "Army." This name was born in our own collective. The publication received the status of a central journal of the Ministry of Defense. The editor-in-chief, Major General Koshelev, also retained his position. Nevertheless, already under Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation General of the Army Pavel Grachev in 1994, the profitable and popular journal "Army" was shut down. Practically all professional military journalists, many with enormous experience, were dismissed. For several years after that, letters from military personnel and civilian staff continued to arrive at the no longer existent editorial office of the journal. During that period I served as deputy editor of a department at the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" and personally saw hundreds of such letters to the closed, but still popular, journal.

In 1992–early 1994, I traveled frequently to the troops on assignment and prepared many various publications on combat training and instruction of military personnel. I never got around to the topic of over-the-horizon radar (zagorizótnaya radiolokátsia). And after August 1991, this problem itself seemed no longer relevant. The state and the Armed Forces were flooded with problems of such strategic, global magnitude that, in comparison with them, the tribulations of the over-the-horizon radar system seemed utterly insignificant. However, this was only appearance. Already at the end of 1991, in two issues—249 and 274—of the central newspaper "Izvestia," published with an enormous circulation, sensational materials appeared from correspondents Boris Reznik and Viktor Litovkin under the title "The Secrets of a 'Dead' Object," which told of the glaring mismanagement allowed by officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Radio Industry of the USSR. From these materials, it followed that in the taiga near the settlement of Bolshaya Kartel, a huge military radio-technical facility had been abandoned to its fate and plundered. Treasure hunters seeking precious metals savagely smashed expensive equipment in a cyclopean structure. After reading these materials, it occurred to me that the authors had clearly not fully understood the reasons why this facility was not guarded by army patrols, and for what purpose it had been created. I placed these materials in my archives on the over-the-horizon radar system. I proposed to the journal's leadership to return again to the topic of the removal from combat duty of the over-the-horizon radar system. I argued that in the press there was an open smear campaign against the over-the-horizon radar system and its creators, who simply had not been given the opportunity to complete the complex radio-electronic weapons system. However, at that time, there was already an investigation into the over-the-horizon radar system, which, after exposés in "Soviet Russia" and other publications, the first President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, had assigned to Prosecutor General Trúbin, KGB Chairman Bakatin, and Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov to conduct. They recommended that I refrain from further investigations into the over-the-horizon radar system. Besides, our reformed journal did not need publications that could provoke a sharp retaliatory response in the central press. "Army" clearly was not the right time for such material, and in other publications during that period on the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex, only negative material was actively published. So there was nowhere to respond to the publication in "Izvestia" with objective material on the over-the-horizon radar system. Incidentally, the central Defense Ministry newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" also replied that they did not need such a topic. They said materials from the investigation would appear, and then we'll publish them. Otherwise, it might create the impression in society that the central military newspaper was protecting the "honor of the uniform" of the Ministry of Defense. There was no point in arguing and proving. So I decided not to rush with publication. Instead, I began collecting data on the topic of combat over-the-horizon radar location.

However, the newspaper "Izvestia," in turn, continued its campaign against the over-the-horizon radar system and its creators. With sensational exposés, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Grigory Vasilievich Kisúnko once again came forward, one of the authors of the first devastating article. In 1992, immediately after the New Year holidays on January 2, apparently to strike as painful a blow as possible at the creators, a material titled "Billions Spent on Bureaucratic Ambitions" was published about the alleged outrageous abuses in the creation of the combat system over-the-horizon radar. In this publication, it was not only the former deputy minister of the radio industry and director of NIÍDAR Vladimir Márkov who was criticized. General-Lieutenant Mikhail Ivanovich Nénashev, Hero of Socialist Labor, head of the 5th Directorate of the 4th General Directorate, was also criticized. Accusations were even directed at party and Komsomol workers of NIÍDAR, who, according to Kisúnko, were ignorant in matters of the over-the-horizon radar system, but made decisions pleasing to their superiors. I hereby apologize to the newspaper "Izvestia" for publishing this old material without permission from the editorial office and the author, without alteration or correction.

Grigory Kisúnko, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Billions Spent on Bureaucratic Ambitions

The materials of our correspondents B. Reznik and V. Litovkin titled "The Secrets of a 'Dead' Object" (issues 249 and 274 of last year), which tell of the glaring facts of mismanagement allowed by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Radio Industry, and the Ministry of the Radio-Electronic Industry, are supplemented by expert analysis. We submit to the reader's judgment the true causes and the essence of this sad phenomenon, which will take place during the new year and the new era in our country.

M. Gorbachev instructed N. Trúbin, V. Bakatin, and E. Shaposhnikov to carefully investigate what had happened and hold the guilty responsible. But so far, there are no results from this investigation.

In the articles "The Secrets of a 'Dead' Object," published in "Izvestia," unfortunately, the deep secrets of the over-the-horizon radar stations—these material monuments to one of the military-technical achievements of a great power—remained behind the scenes. But the essence of the phenomenon that caused these facts is, perhaps, even more serious than the material loss.

It would be wrong to represent these facts only as mismanagement at morally and technically obsolete, decommissioned, or subject to decommissioning military facilities. The most scandalous thing is that, in essence, the "dead" object is not dead; it is a monstrous abortion that was born dead—completely incapable of performing the tasks assigned to it to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from the territory of the USA, and, by the way, to detect the signs of the launch of anti-satellite missiles from the same territory, and much more.

They were stillbirths because of their absolute inability to perform the tasks assigned to them—to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles starting from U.S. territory. And it is precisely in this that lies the true cause of the loss of the huge investment in the over-the-horizon radar system. This is where the Billion-Ruble Robbery of the state is hidden, not in transistors, picked out by boys from unguarded equipment, and certainly not in the separate criminal acts of scrap collectors and embezzlers, although these phenomena cannot be ignored either.

Decisions about the creation of the over-the-horizon radar system were prepared and made contrary to scientifically sound warnings from competent specialists, and these same specialists were subjected to cruel sanctions. For example, in the directorate of radiophysics of the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Academy of Sciences, Chief Designer Aleksandr Nikolaevich Musátov proved in his reports that the echo-signal from a ballistic missile flame would be thousands of times weaker than the signals from interference, and therefore building the over-the-horizon radar system would be pointless. But instead of considering this scientifically sound critical analysis, Musátov was persecuted and even expelled from the Communist Party.

And the Americans indeed 'allowed' information to leak that they were about to begin creating an over-the-horizon radar system (Project TiPi—Taylor Project): a transmitting position on U.S. territory and two receiving positions on the islands of Cyprus and Taiwan, created in the mid-1970s as part of a global intelligence program. There was reason to believe this leak.

This gave the director of NIÍDAR V. Márkov and the leadership of the military customer's directorate the occasion to launch an entire program for building Soviet over-the-horizon radar systems. And after V. Márkov's promotion to the position of deputy minister of the radio industry and the head of the radio-electronic industry, this program was transformed into a comprehensive construction project of multiple over-the-horizon radar stations.

Meanwhile, the Americans, convinced that their idea was unpromising, decided to discontinue the creation of the over-the-horizon radar system and transferred the receiving centers built on Cyprus and Taiwan to CIA signals intelligence (SIGINT) services.

The warnings made in A. Musátov's report were fully confirmed when the developers, on the basis of already-built over-the-horizon radar data, presented materials from 44 supposedly obtained records during the launches of ballistic missiles. But the experts in the Military Academy, having carefully analyzed these records, determined that there was not a single genuine signal of a ballistic missile in them. They were all false signals generated by interference.

But even after this, V. Márkov (from industry) and M. Nénashev (from the customer) put forward the initiative to develop a design sketch under the cipher "Globus," which provided for the creation of a network of over-the-horizon radar stations by deploying them in a chain along the Soviet borders with the United States. To do this, it was planned to allocate enormous material and human resources.

However, this did not even deter the 'over-the-horizon' adventurers: NIÍDAR began to tempt the Navy with "Dúga," and it is not unlikely that soon we will learn of new dead 'objects,' but now under the naval flag. But this time the people involved in the enterprise will have even more difficulty proving their innocence, because the military-maritime dimension of the scandal will be added to the enormous financial losses.

Although the unique collective of NIÍDAR, formed in the development of skip-distance radar of the decimeter range, under the directorship of V. Márkov began to shift mainly to the empty subject matter of the over-the-horizon radar system, A. Kuzminský, the old director of the institute, withdrew from this problematic area and concentrated his efforts on the development of a new over-the-horizon radar station being built near Grodno.

This is how the scientific leadership of the creation of a new radar station in the Grodno area was decapitated. As a result, the construction of this station, which began in 1982 with a completion deadline of 1987, turned into an indefinite construction project, which never reached completion before the collapse of the USSR.

Thus the adventure with the over-the-horizon radar system, in addition to direct material damage to the state, also led to the complete destruction of the scientific and technical potential in the field of development of skip-distance radar systems of the decimeter range. The most valuable specialists left the institute, and the scientific direction itself was abandoned.

But "Dúga" is only part of the planting of absurdities that became embedded in antimissile defense (PRO) and missile warning (SPRN) problems with the arrival of the 'extraordinary commissar' V. Márkov. Certainly, competition of ideas, projects, and programs in science is necessary and beneficial. But this monopolist, the bearer of magnificent titles, used them, with the support of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the military-industrial commission, and the Ministry of Radio Industry, as a mandate from these organs for uncontrolled arbitrariness and lawlessness.

An absolute monopolist, bearer of ostentatious titles, used them with the support of the Defense Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the military-industrial commission, and the Ministry of Radio Industry as a mandate from these organs for uncontrolled despotism and arbitrary rule.

I think such despotism will result in losses for us of yet more than one billion rubles of the people's money and dozens of other stillborn 'top secret' facilities.

Grigory Vasilievich KISÚNKO. Born in 1918, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. Laureate of the Lenin Prize, Hero of Socialist Labor, designer of the first Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems. Member-correspondent of the Russian Academy of Sciences, author of numerous books on the history of Soviet antimissile defense. Creator of the S-25 air defense system.

There is no point in commenting on this material. All the previous chapters of this book refute its positions and statements. However, already in January 1992, I was frankly troubled by a clearly dismissive attitude toward the people who created the system. In the article, the author essentially suggests that the creators of the over-the-horizon radar system were fools or deliberate wreckers, that the entire program was some kind of whim, built on the ambitions of officials.

I managed to meet with the former secretary of the party committee of NIÍDAR Vyacheslav Mákletсov only in 2007. He learned from my friends at NIÍDAR that I was writing a documentary book-investigation about the over-the-horizon radar system. We met at a café and recorded a conversation.

A transcript of the recorded conversation with the former secretary of the party committee of NIÍDAR, Vyacheslav Borisovich Mákletсov.

—Vyacheslav Borisovich, in what period did you work at NIÍDAR and what positions did you hold?

I came to NIÍDAR in September 1964 as a leading engineer-designer of Scientific Department 4. If you don't mind, I'll start from the very beginning of my work biography.

In 1958, I graduated from the Moscow Mechanical Engineering Institute (MÁMI) and was assigned by distribution to work at Scientific Research Institute-10 as an engineer-designer in the design bureau of the institute. This work, as I later realized, was my real specialty, and I was good at it. The head of our bureau was a candidate of sciences who had significant authority and respect in the institute.

Having successfully completed all types of testing of the product called "Gurzúf" and transferred the documentation for manufacturing at a serial plant in Rostov-on-Don, I, for certain serious reasons, transferred to work at NIÍDAR. The institute was located in Moscow and I had my own apartment there, it was possible to visit my wife and daughter more often. But first of all, it seemed that there were more opportunities for technical and scientific growth.

In December 1964, I was accepted as a member of the CPSU, and was repeatedly elected secretary of the party bureau of the engineering department, a member of the party committee, and chairman of the party commission under the party committee. In 1978, I was elected secretary of the party committee of the institute. After three years of successful work, I was re-elected to this position. And from 1984 to 1991, I was deputy secretary of the party committee.

NIÍDAR was created on the basis of Factory No. 37 (mechanical). Then its production was redirected to the manufacture and development of radio-technical devices. For this purpose, leading specialists and engineers were transferred to the enterprise from the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Academy of Sciences and from other organizations. The party committee of NIÍDAR was given the rights of a district party committee regarding the admission to the party and consideration of personal files of communists. The secretary of the party committee and two of his deputies were elected at the conference of communists of the institute.

Thus I received my appointment to the position of party committee secretary.

—And why did such an influential party official from Serbia treat you so well?

First of all, because of the significance of the work being carried out at the institute, I believe. At NIÍDAR, scientific work was carried out in three most important directions for the country—missile warning systems (SPRN), anti-satellite systems (SKKP), and antimissile defense (PRO). The decision had already been made to create one of the largest scientific and technical centers of the USSR for these areas at NIÍDAR.

At the same time, conflicts periodically arose in the collective at NIÍDAR, as well as between party and administrative leadership. The Defense Department of the Central Committee had to intervene. For these reasons, they had a certain demand for the secretary of the party committee to be an experienced and authoritative person.

—But to competently resolve disagreements and disputes on scientific and technical problems, one needs appropriate training and experience. Did you have them? After all, the same "Izvestia" reported in January 1992 that you, as secretary of the party committee, participated in scientific and technical discussions and made decisions on complex radio-technical issues, which, according to the newspaper, was inappropriate.

Well, I'll start by saying that the author of the article in the newspaper never saw me in person, but accused me of incompetence. For me, as one of the leaders of NIÍDAR, and later of "Vympel" Research and Production Association, it was unfortunate that a respected publication wrote this way. However, the accusation in the article does not correspond to reality.

According to the regulations, the secretary of the party committee was a member of the Scientific and Technical Council (NTS) of the enterprise (he alone, not the Komsomol secretary and the trade union chair, as stated in the newspaper publication). This was primarily due to the need to ensure party control over the implementation of work, to monitor the state of labor discipline and morale in the enterprise.

But in matters of party discipline, personnel policy, control of implementation of work, and mobilizing the collective to solve assigned tasks, the party committee secretary had to be on the cutting edge. That's how I conducted myself.

Questions of over-the-horizon radar location and the problems associated with it were discussed constantly at NIÍDAR. There were meetings of the Scientific and Technical Council, various conferences involving a broad scientific community. Everyone discussed the matter.

After repeated examination and discussion at the Scientific and Technical Council of the enterprise, in the military-industrial commission, in the Ministry of Radio Industry, and in the Ministry of Defense, a decision was made to create a combat sample while simultaneously continuing work on an experimental one. The head of the design and development department played a large role in preparing this decision.

I would also like to point out one more thing. Kuzminský, becoming director, using his organizational and literally diplomatic abilities, quickly normalized the situation in the collective of the institute and restored order to the work.

But not everything went smoothly. In the early 1980s, work on the over-the-horizon radar system and the automated system "Volga" encountered serious difficulties. Deadlines began to be missed. And during this difficult period, I was informed that the Deputy Minister of Radio Industry V. Márkov was coming to NIÍDAR with an inspection. Such visits from high-ranking officials were usually significant.

So Márkov was not only aware of all the affairs, but often made decisions himself, especially in the sphere of work on the over-the-horizon radar system. However, the very form of this participation, especially in the absence of Kuzminský, did not strengthen the authority of the director.

It was precisely during this period that relations became sharply aggravated with one of the chief designers, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Musátov. In the newspaper "Izvestia," he is portrayed as an active fighter against the combat systems being developed in the institute.

I take the liberty of noting that this is not quite so—or rather, not so at all. Indeed, Musátov criticized the work being conducted at the institute, except, of course, his own. He began to demand the transfer of all resources to his project. This created serious tension in the collective. In the view of some, Musátov was a principled specialist who defended scientific truth. Others saw a man who, pursuing personal ambition, tried to impose his ideas at any cost.

In the interest of preserving the integrity of the institute, improving the moral and psychological climate, and ensuring manageability under these difficult conditions, after repeated discussions, a decision was made to remove Musátov from his position as chief designer of the direction.

Moreover, there was another circumstance that compromised Aleksandr Nikolaevich. Using him, if one wished, it was possible at that time to put a fat cross on the career of any person, first of all because he had already been thrown out of the CPSU. On the eve of his resignation, which he voluntarily sought, he had already been through a difficult investigation by party and state security organs.

After this, Musátov was discharged from the army, relieved of his duties as chief designer of the direction, and dismissed from NIÍDAR.

Frankly, for a long time the behavior of Musátov remained a mystery to me. A new chief designer was appointed to his position. Specialists who had previously worked with Musátov on the creation of the "Volga" radar system began to take the initiative, and work progressed successfully.

I had very good working relations with the leadership of the Ministry of Radio Industry, which greatly facilitated the work. At the end of 1982, the Deputy Minister of Radio Industry Oleg Andreyevich Lósev and General-Lieutenant Ye. Sháposhnikov, the chief of the directorate in the Ministry of Defense, visited Kuzminský at NIÍDAR. After their visit, the situation in the collective improved sharply, and the work gained momentum.

Later, I learned that F.A. Kuzminský had turned to the new party committee and the new secretary of the party committee asking for help in sorting out the situation with the over-the-horizon radar and in resolving mutual misunderstandings with Márkov.

And what remarkable things did Kuzminský do for his employees at the Nikolayev branch of NIÍDAR?

First of all, at his initiative and under his leadership, this branch was established. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich obtained funding for the construction of a good building of the institute on the outskirts of Nikolayev, residential buildings for employees, and a cultural and leisure facility for the families of the workers. A good scientific collective was gathered there, and scientific work was being conducted there with the highest results.

Why did you, as an established engineer and designer, agree to become a party official?

In my youth, when I was just starting to work as an engineer, an old-time worker at Scientific Research Institute-10, a person I greatly respected, a war participant, an honest and principled man, A.A. Anáshkin, approached me. He persuaded me to take on a public role in the party organization. At that time, I had not yet become a member of the Communist Party.

I knew and saw the possibilities of the party committee secretary's influence on the situation at the institute. There was an opportunity to tackle serious issues at higher levels, and also to provide assistance to scientific workers in achieving their goals. But I also understood that this required much effort, some sacrifice, and a willingness to serve the collective, not yourself.

On the whole, I am very satisfied with my work biography. I knew many intelligent and good people, and was fortunate to work with many of them. I always had living and interesting work.

—According to your words, it turns out that the party committee of NIÍDAR supported the over-the-horizon radar theme? And how would you characterize the relationship that developed between Kuzminský and Márkov?

Yes, the party committee unanimously supported the work of the director and chief designer Kuzminský F.A., just as it supported the work of other chief designers. First of all, all the work being carried out at the institute was important for the defense of the country and for the development of science and technology. Secondly, the state had allocated significant resources for this work, and we could not allow them to be spent in vain.

Márkov's relations with Kuzminský had been established since the time of their joint work at Design Bureau-1. And these relations were quite peculiar. Sometimes they could be called friendly, but to a considerable degree they were also colored by rivalry and some tension.

I know, from eyewitness accounts, that when they were returning to Moscow in one car from a difficult meeting in Solnechnogorsk, Márkov said to Kuzminský: 'Admit, Franz Aleksandrovich, that my opinion is more correct than yours.' Kuzminský did not agree with him and answered: 'Vladimir Ivanovich, on this question, I will disagree with you.'

I noticed that when everything was going smoothly, Márkov, like all of us, called Kuzminský by his name and patronymic, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. As soon as problems or difficulties arose, he immediately began to call him 'Franz.' It seemed that with this familiar form of address, he wished to show his superiority.

Once, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich came into my office at the party committee, and after a conversation, I walked him out to the corridor. As we parted, we shook hands. At that moment, Márkov passed by us, pretending not to notice, quickly walking past. Later, Kuzminský said to me: 'See how he treats me? He is now in power, and I am dependent on him, and therefore he is demonstrating his superiority.'

Of course, Vladimir Ivanovich did not object to my transfer to the Central Design Bureau "Vympel." Having survived the conflict with Musátov, Márkov did not want a relatively independent secretary of the party committee to be at the head of NIÍDAR.

—Some specialists claim that Kuzminský was literally pushed to present the still-incomplete system for state testing. At the same time, the working out of the equipment complex required almost a year of work, but as they say, time was limited.

—Yes, that's how it really was. Our institute found itself in quite a difficult situation during that period. The new automated system of Musátov, because its cost according to the experts' data was significantly increasing, and the promised characteristics were becoming worse and worse, fell out of favor.

The Director of NIÍDAR Márkov needed somehow to prove himself, to demonstrate that he was doing better on this post than Kuzminský. I participated in practically all the meetings on the over-the-horizon radar system. I personally saw how persistently and even aggressively Márkov insisted on submitting the over-the-horizon radar system for state testing, despite the fact that Kuzminský objected.

—But still. If Franz Kuzminský had been given the time, would he have been able to work through the entire combat system of the over-the-horizon radar?

—I think no one will answer this question reliably. But, in my opinion, during that period, only the chief designer himself, Franz Aleksandrovich Kuzminský, could have significantly improved the performance indicators of the over-the-horizon radar system's operation.

In my opinion, Kuzminský was right in his scientific and technical search. I think this direction will continue to develop. It is possible that in some time powerful over-the-horizon radar systems will appear, operating in new frequency bands and with new principles.

That was the interesting conversation I had with the supposedly incompetent, as the newspaper "Izvestia" reported, former secretary of the party committee of NIÍDAR. This conversation exposes yet another newspaper myth about the over-the-horizon radar system—that the responsibility for the failure lay with incompetent officials. As my conversation with Mákletсov shows, the officials at NIÍDAR were reasonably competent, but they had to operate in the complex and contradictory conditions of Soviet science and technology policy created by much more powerful forces.