Chapter 3 "Secret Letter to General Staff on the Closure of the Over-the-Horizon Radar System"

Original: Глава 3 «Секретное письмо в Генштаб о закрытии ЗГРЛС»

A phone call to the editorial office—words from an unknown caller with obvious veiled threats about my possible transfer from Moscow to continue military service in the same Khabarovsk troubled me considerably. Thoughts even arose as to whether I shouldn't simply abandon this entire investigation into the over-the-horizon radar system (ZGRS). However, after that call, nothing happened. Everything remained as before. Each day at 9:00 I arrived at work at the magazine's editorial office, dealing with current and urgent matters. Yet I did not forget about the over-the-horizon detection theme. I remembered the warning from my department head that it was under the control of Editor-in-Chief General Nikolai Koshelev. But the investigation was clearly stalling. For some reason, former Chief Designer Franz Kuzminsky was not answering my phone calls. Several times I called the headquarters of the Antimissile and Antispace Defense (AMD, ASD) of the Air Defense Forces (PVO) of the country. I explained to the assistant commander, Senior Lieutenant Igor Kanashenkov, why I was seeking a meeting with Colonel General Volter Makarovych Kraskovskiy. But each time the senior lieutenant politely explained that the commander was away and suggested I call back in a few days. And once again, further investigation, for reasons beyond my control, was postponed indefinitely. Only the AMD and ASD headquarters could clarify many specific questions about the over-the-horizon radar system problem. It was in these forces that the over-the-horizon radars were under experimental operation. And if the over-the-horizon radar system combat system, indeed, was a worthless project on which a billion in defense money had been spent, then the military could frankly tell the truth about everything. It was in their interest. They had nothing to lose from publication of accurate information on this problem. After all, it was precisely to the AMD and ASD forces that military-industrial complex leaders, together with interested lobbyists from the Ministry of Defense, may have imposed such expensive weaponry, which could not possibly be effective. But the AMD and ASD either clearly avoided speaking with me, or the commander really was away. I had to wait patiently. And this created obvious discomfort in my soul. At the same time, whether at work, in the metro train, or on a bus, I still recalled the telephone conversation with the unknown man. Beyond the veiled threat about my transfer from Moscow, the words of the man troubled me—that they knew where my wife walked with our young daughter.

"If unknown persons are informed of such details of my personal life," I thought to myself, "then they had investigated me. In any case, they know who I am, they know about my daughter and wife. Yet I am completely in the dark about them. Who are they? What capabilities do they have? And what if, as I continue my investigation and get closer to objective information about the over-the-horizon radar system, they really do start acting? What can I oppose to them? What can I then count on, what help can I expect?"

"No, none," I answered myself, "in the Ministry of Defense, in the militia, in the KGB, there are no influential relatives or friends. Major's insignia will not protect either me or my family from possible actions by unknown persons."

The stalling of the investigation, the anxious reflections after the telephone call from the unknown man increasingly led to the thought of going to the editor-in-chief and refusing to pursue the over-the-horizon radar system topic. To explain that an investigation of such a global issue was beyond my powers and capabilities. Probably that is what would have happened after such rather gloomy reflections. And I would have refused, to the detriment of my professional image, this investigation. Journalistic courage and principled behavior are certainly excellent qualities for a fighter of the printed word. But behind this there must stand substantial support. And here, from a literally stalemate situation, a woman helped me unexpectedly escape—the woman from whom we were renting a one-room apartment in Kapotnya for 150 rubles.

As if I had jinxed myself when, after the unknown person's telephone call to the editorial office, I had told my colleagues that the landlady had raised the price of the rent.

One evening after work, as usual I came home. In the kitchen at the table sat my wife, the landlady of the apartment, and her common-law husband. Before this I had seen him only a couple of times. A taciturn man with a sullen expression on his face, still relatively young. His common-law wife—the landlady—was older. She visited us every month and collected the rent—nearly half my major's salary. Everyone was drinking tea. My wife handed the landlady the money for the apartment. She put it in her wallet. And then, looking directly into my eyes, said that for subletting this apartment they were being offered 250 rubles. They did not want to give up the extra 100 rubles. So either we pay 250 rubles a month for the apartment or we move out. We had known this woman for about three years now. She was the own sister of another acquaintance of ours, with whom my wife was on friendly terms. Only this prevented me from sending the landlady somewhere far away in language that was not literary, but understood throughout the world in Russian. On 100 rubles a month, a family could not live in Moscow. We agreed that we would use the apartment for another month while we searched for other accommodations. Already on the balcony, sitting with an evening newspaper, I thought that moving to a different place would be for the better. Perhaps, this would for some time during the over-the-horizon radar system investigation protect my family. My wife did not know about the telephone call to the editorial office, nor in general about the difficult investigation into the over-the-horizon radar system. I did not want to worry her. That evening on the balcony, I decided for myself that I would not tell anyone where I found new accommodations.

But where to search for housing in a city overflowing at that time with the capital? The streets were covered with notices that the family of a military man was looking to rent any apartment. For literally two weeks I practically did not deal with the over-the-horizon radar system topic. I was searching for housing. My wife and I visited various apartments. The prices were astronomical. The quality of housing offered was often simply scandalous. I was in an impasse. And only then did I recall that the magazine had a social fund for housing its editorial staff.

A few days later I called the AMD and ASD headquarters again. Probably my call to the political directorate of the country played a role. The duty officer replied that the chief of staff expected me. My persistence finally paid off. I was invited to meet with the chief of staff of AMD and ASD.

The structure and tasks of the Air Defense Forces (PVO) of the country were well known to me. But regarding AMD and ASD, due to the global state tasks being solved by these forces and heightened secrecy, for me and many others in our country this was a sealed book. I wanted to understand what was happening in these troops, what tasks they performed, what the structure of their command was.

Back in 1989 I was included in one inspection commission for work in the forces, then headed by a youthful and trim colonel. During the inspection I frequently turned to him, edited his articles, discussed military-journalistic topics. Now he had risen to the rank of general-major and served in an important position in the General Staff.

He had a fairly spacious office. On the walls were large panels covered with dark curtains. Under them, possibly, were concealed maps with deployments of troop groupings. I wanted to take a peek under them, but of course I restrained myself. On his desk lay several secret envelopes, folders with classified documents. Before he received me, he had hurriedly put them away in a safe.

"What concerns the military press," he asked me, as an old acquaintance, and offered me a choice of tea or coffee.

Without interrupting me, he listened to my account of the investigation into the over-the-horizon radar system. For several seconds he lowered his head and looked at his hands, which he had placed on the desktop. He drummed his fingers to some silent rhythm, then looked up and asked, "Tell me, have you indeed decided to take this up?"

"So, so," he said, as if gathering his thoughts, "you are investigating a difficult and noble topic. You understand, personally I was outraged by the publication in the newspaper Soviet Russia. Some kind of sweeping blackening, vile accusations against the military science, against the creators of our defense systems, against the developers of the over-the-horizon radar system. This is irresponsible journalism. They write about billions spent in vain."

I must admit honestly that I did not expect such a reaction from my acquaintance.

Then he told how by the mid-1970s the USA already possessed the most powerful rocket-nuclear triad consisting of strategic ballistic missiles, strategic strike aviation with nuclear bombs and missiles, and submarines with missiles. The Soviet Union at that time also had a nuclear triad, but in the opinion of our military command, it was somewhat inferior to the American one in terms of reliability and responsiveness.

"You understand, such a strike against the USSR, especially at that time, could quite possibly have been delivered completely by chance," the general-major said unhurriedly. "An automated system of warning of rocket and nuclear attack (Missile Attack Warning System—SPRNMN) was needed. The question of creating an absolutely reliable system to warn of a possible American nuclear strike was of state importance. This system had to be protected against all possible contingencies, including false alarms. The over-the-horizon radar system was to become one of the elements of this warning system."

There are legends in the forces about Votintsev in general. One acquaintance of mine from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR told me that the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA conducted surveillance of Colonel General Votintsev for 19 years through reconnaissance satellites and radio intelligence. They thought Votintsev was a very dangerous opponent to American strategic interests.

He never bent the knee to anyone, even before General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. He was concerned for the mission entrusted to him and his troops. During wartime, even during his command of separate units of the rocket forces, he was granted the singular honor of receiving phone calls directly from the General Secretary. He was the kind of commander who took responsibility for the decisions he made.

"Can you give me Votintsev's telephone number? I need to meet with him and talk about the over-the-horizon radar system," I asked, looking questioningly at my conversation partner.

"Unfortunately, I do not have direct contact with the colonel general," replied my acquaintance. "I have met him several times at various celebratory events; he recognized me and would greet me. Yuri Vsevolodovich Glukhov, the first deputy commander of the Missile Attack Warning System, is his right hand. He would certainly be able to introduce you to Votintsev and arrange a meeting. Call Glukhov. I am confident that he will help you in this matter."

"So you were saying that it was precisely Votintsev who began forming the AMD and ASD forces in 1967?" I began to clarify, and then, showing my knowledge, said that Votintsev also formed the Missile Attack Warning System (SPRNMN) and was responsible for creating the over-the-horizon radar system.

"The military formations of the SPRNMN—separate radio-technical complexes were included in ASD," noted my conversation partner, "but the tasks facing the Missile Attack Warning System were such that even the most advanced radar stations deployed in various parts of the Soviet Union at fixed locations could not provide complete coverage of the approaches from the direction of a potential enemy. The over-the-horizon radar system was created precisely to fill in the gaps in the coverage area."

"Indeed, General Votintsev had to confront an extremely difficult task," I supported the conversation. "How did he manage to accomplish it?"

"This must be discussed with him, if he agrees," the general-major interjected. "The creation of AMD and ASD was a task of special state importance. The best scientific and production enterprises of the country were engaged in it. The Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the academy of sciences, and numerous research and design institutes were involved."

"And why was the over-the-horizon radar system combat system created? Was there a need for it at that time, since various military reconnaissance satellites were already flying in space?" I asked a leading question.

"The over-the-horizon radar system combat system, comprising two enormous radio-technical stations, was supposed to significantly strengthen the entire Soviet national Missile Attack Warning System. Directly from our territory, with radar means we could control enemy missiles from the moment of their launch, track them throughout their flight, and determine the vector of attack. This provided complete overlap of the tracking of all approaches to Soviet territory."

Subsequently, the general-major told me about the composition and structure of the AMD and ASD forces and the tasks they performed. But at the same time, he said that this information was not yet for publication and was being given purely for educational purposes, for my professional development and better understanding of what I was investigating.

A couple of hours later, quite satisfied, I left the white-stone building of the Ministry of Defense on the Arbat. The general-major from the Main Intelligence Directorate had given me quite comprehensive information. Now I could go to the suburban station called 'Chyornoe' in the Moscow region.

The electric train from the Kursk Station of the capital to the 'Chyornoe' station on the Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod) line took approximately forty minutes. The morning was summer-like, sunny, and warm. Outside the train window, dacha villages, birch groves, and plowed fields flashed by. In the carriage, there were few passengers. I sat by the window, looking at the passing landscape and thinking about what awaited me at the headquarters of the Air Defense Forces.

The document verification procedure and obtaining a pass did not take much time. I will not dwell on them. With a one-time pass I walked past the sentry onto the guarded territory. For about fifteen minutes I walked along the paths of this headquarters, looking for the building where the AMD and ASD headquarters were located.

The pass indicated the building, floor, and room number where I had permission to enter. Sentries would not let me into other buildings of the headquarters. In the waiting room of the chief of staff of AMD and ASD, Major-General Anatoly Kravtsov, I waited about ten minutes. The chief of staff received me immediately.

"Sorry, of course," I reacted to the chief of staff's message, and at the same time I cursed inwardly, "but what can you do? I will have to come again."

"Perhaps then, on the topic of the over-the-horizon radar system, we could speak with you?" I proposed in turn to the chief of staff.

The general's negative answer cooled my journalistic enthusiasm. However, after this, the chief of staff said that the chief engineer of the Missile Attack Warning System directorate, Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov, would meet with me and speak with me. He said that the over-the-horizon radar system was his sphere, and he would be able to provide me with the necessary information.

Now in 2007 I no longer remember the face of Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov, I do not remember what his voice was like, his manner of behavior, what his office was like. On my work desk in front of me is only a cassette record of a conversation from that long-ago conversation, which I recorded on a tape recorder. The copy is poorly preserved, recorded on a low-quality magnetic tape. The sound is at times unclear. But the content is clear. Kapitonov spoke frankly about the technical characteristics of the over-the-horizon radar system, about why it did not meet the tactical and technical requirements, about why this expensive combat system did not justify the billions spent on it.

I cannot understand how a copy of a letter to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR came into my hands. It is certainly not a document for journalists. It is quite possible that during the conversation with Colonel Kapitonov, he decided to show me these secret documents, hoping that in my journalistic investigation I would make use of them to expose the ill-considered decision to create the over-the-horizon radar system. It is quite possible that he knew about other cases when classified information had been transmitted to journalists and published in the press. In any case, I have this document in my archive.

A transcript of the cassette recording of a conversation with the chief engineer of the Missile Attack Warning System directorate, Colonel Kaptonov Vladimir Semyonovich

.

"The 'Krug' (Circle) facility was created to develop current information about radio wave propagation, the state of the medium through which they propagated, and to select the optimal frequency range. But then newer, more advanced facilities appeared, and the 'Krug' facility became unnecessary for our needs. Its characteristics did not fully meet the tactical and technical requirements for detecting ballistic missiles. In general, scientific research had shown that creating an over-the-horizon radar system for the detection of ballistic missiles, given the complexity and unpredictability of ionospheric conditions, particularly in polar regions, was a very difficult undertaking. The project ran into unexpected difficulties. Many parameters could not be achieved, and at some point, the specialists working on the project concluded that further work was not advisable."

In 1979, the commission on military-industrial questions under the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to close the 'Krug' facility. By decision of the Minister of Defense, the entire engineering complex of 'Krug'—all kinds of pumps, electrical equipment, antenna systems, cables, and other equipment worth millions of rubles—was transferred from the State Research and Design Bureau (NIIDA-Ra)

to a State Research and Production Technical Enterprise (GPTPE), which dealt with the installation and adjustment of the over-the-horizon radar system apparatus. This apparatus was never returned to us. The military unit of the over-the-horizon radar system provided security for 'Krug' until all elements of the Krug engineering complex were dismantled. There was no military guard on the 'Krug'. Specialists from NIIDA-Ra and GPTPE appeared there irregularly. No one bore responsibility for this former over-the-horizon radar system facility. This was exploited by local seekers of precious metals. They began systematically to rob the apparatus. In the end, on May 9, 1990, the unguarded facility caught fire. This fire was reported to the military prosecutor of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur garrison."

To confirm his words, Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov showed me one curious reference document, from which I also made a copy.

"By decision 1654/SKBZ of March 26, 1979, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, the Deputy Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Radio Industry of the USSR, the 'Krug' device was withdrawn from the structure of the 5Н32 device (over-the-horizon radar system) in 1979. At the time this decision was taken, the installation of equipment had not been completed; it had not been transferred to military unit 55419 (over-the-horizon radar system near Komsomolsk-on-Amur). It remained under the material responsibility of the GPTPE enterprise. In accordance with this same decision, the 'Krug' equipment was further developed and work was organized on it under the 'Yantar' (Amber) project."

In 1985, on the basis of documents on the use of the 'Krug' equipment, approved by the commander of military unit 77969 and the Deputy Minister of Radio Industry of the USSR on September 19, 1985, the equipment was transferred for safekeeping to the GPTPE. As for the antenna-feeder device (AFD), it was transferred to the State Radio Plant (GRP) for further transfer to various interested organizations and educational institutions, including the Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute."

"Regarding the question of ensuring the safety of the equipment, military unit 55419 repeatedly appealed to NIIDA-Ra, military units 03366, 77969. However, no measures were taken. In October 1989, a commission from NIIDA-Ra conducted an inspection of the 'Krug' equipment and issued recommendations for its write-off. An act of January 30, 1990 was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country. This act was sent to NIIDA-Ra, military units 77969, 55419."

In April 1990, representatives of the USSR State Repository (Gokhrana—State Committee for Precious Metals and Stones) worked at military unit 55419 with the participation of military prosecutors of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District (RFMDO) and military unit 03366 to inspect compliance with document requirements for storage and transfer of technical means containing precious metals."

It is quite possible that Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov and I discussed in detail the fate of the 'Krug' device and the entire over-the-horizon radar system. However, in my archive there is no documentary confirmation of what was actually discussed between us. Regarding 'Krug', everything is clear. The Missile Attack Warning System troops rejected it as unnecessary. For industry, it also became a burden. So unknown persons plundered it and then burned it. And all the loose ends went into the water. The documents on 'Krug' speak only of the negligence of certain officials, but in no way of any willfulness of an organized group of persons interested in adopting the combat system of the over-the-horizon radar system, which was good for nothing. It is quite probable that eighteen years ago in the AMD and ASD directorate I asked Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov about the fate of the entire over-the-horizon radar system, what happened to it during that period. And then the chief engineer of the directorate showed me yet another document.

Its cipher was RKS No. 151. D-90. It was addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, General of the Army M.A. Moiseev.

"The creation of the over-the-horizon radar system comprising two nodes was accompanied by difficulties, mainly related to insufficient knowledge of ionospheric behavior in the area of the North Pole ('Polar cap')."

"The required characteristics of the nodes were not achieved; their contribution to the combat capabilities of the Missile Attack Warning System (SPRNMN) for single ballistic missiles proved to be insignificant. And these nodes were not adopted into the armament of the Soviet Army."

"In order to solve these problems, a comprehensive program of research and improvements to the construction of the over-the-horizon radar system was planned. It was not possible to carry it out due to the accident at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Station."

"Research on these radars regarding the detection of air targets, conducted in parallel with work on the detection of ballistic missiles, showed stable capabilities of the radars in detecting aerodynamic targets."

"The over-the-horizon radar system near Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which was on combat duty, was not adopted into the armament of the Soviet Army and in 1989 was removed from duty. Work was deployed on it to detect aerodynamic targets in the interests of warning of air attack from the north-eastern direction."

This document was signed by—General of the Army I. Tretiak, Colonel General V. Denisov, Lieutenant General V. Mironov.

My extremely frank conversation with Colonel Vladimir Kapitonov was additionally valuable because he offered to arrange a meeting with the commander of the over-the-horizon radar system, which was located near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. It turned out that he had transferred from the Far East and now served in the suburban Kubinka. Right before me, from his office using official communications, Kapitonov called Kubinka and spoke about my desire to meet and speak. In addition to this, Kapitonov suggested who could give me the home telephone number of Colonel General Votintsev. Thus, my trip to the headquarters of the Air Defense Forces of the country in the suburban 'Chyornoe' [location] was very successful. The journalistic investigation was accelerating significantly.