Chapter 11: The Pre-New Year Rehabilitation of Kuzminsky

Original: Глава 11 «Предновогодняя реабилитация Кузьминского»

In late November 1993, a familiar colonel from the apparatus of the Chief of Armaments of the Russian Federation Armed Forces unexpectedly called the editorial office of the journal. He reported that an invitation to a scientific and technical conference had arrived at their office from NIIDARS. Without fully comprehending what I heard, I made a dismissive sound into the receiver, saying, well, so what, many conferences take place at that institute.

"Don't interrupt me," the colonel replied, "but first listen to the name of the conference."

The information surprised and puzzled me. The conference was called "Formation and Development of Domestic Over-the-Horizon Location." The invitation stated that it was dedicated to the memory of the chief designer of the direction, Franz Aleksandrovich Kuzminsky.

"Well, what do you know," I thought roughly at the time, "just three years ago the Russian democratic press published literally slanderous materials about the creators of the combat system SGRLC (ЗРГРЛС). Franz Kuzminsky was turned away in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Radio Industry, the Government. He died without being able to prove anything to anyone. The scientist and designer were not believed. And just two years after his death, NIIDARS organizes an official scientific-technical conference on the rehabilitation of the scientist, to which representatives of all the aforementioned agencies are invited. Is this not a farce?"

"And when will this conference take place?" I asked my acquaintance.

"The invitation says in December," the colonel replied and added, "and aren't you being invited? After all, you were the only one during the persecution of over-the-horizon location in the state who spoke out in print in its defense."

However, I was not sent an invitation to the conference.

"All sorts of things happen," I thought to myself, "maybe in the organizational fuss they forgot, or simply did not take into account my modest person."

Without deliberating long, I called the reception of the director of NIIDARS, Alexander Aleksandrovich Trukhmanov. The secretary listened to my request to connect with the director, asked what the matter was, and asked me to wait a bit. After apparently consulting with someone, she said that the director was very busy and would call me regarding the invitation to the conference. However, no one called. It is a shame, of course, that I did not attend that conference. But what can one do if the institute decided it was appropriate not to invite me. That is the prerogative of the organizers. Already in exasperation I waved my hand at that conference and at NIIDARS to boot. I was swamped with other matters. However, three months later, a security guard from the lobby of the "Krasnaya Zvezda" building called me and said that some woman had brought me a package. It was written on it that these were conference materials from NIIDARS. Indeed, the package contained seven substantial volumes on the development of over-the-horizon location technology.

I became interested and began to read them. The more I read, the more I was astonished. The materials fully confirmed what I had written in my articles. More importantly, they presented a radically different assessment of Kuzminsky. A rehabilitation was indeed taking place, but I understood: the scientist's reputation was being restored not out of a sudden rush of justice, but for a completely different reason. The process had been set in motion, apparently, by external political circumstances beyond the control of individual officials.

Let me briefly explain the situation. In October 1993, a constitutional crisis occurred in Russia. At that time, President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet of Russia, which opposed his reforms. The crisis became acute, leading to military clashes and significant casualties. In this situation, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Aleksandr Kotenkov, was instructed to prepare materials demonstrating the technological and scientific potential of Russia for negotiations with foreign partners. This was done to show that Russia possessed advanced military technologies and could not be treated as a weak player in negotiations.

The Ministry of Defense decided to use the materials on the over-the-horizon location for this purpose. It was decided to hold a scientific conference devoted to Kuzminsky and present the materials of this conference to foreign scientific institutions and organizations. This was a demonstration: look, Russia has created a globally unique technology, a unique and unrepeatable combat system. This was an attempt to prove that Russia is a great scientific and technical power.

Thus, according to my understanding, the origins of the December conference dedicated to the memory of Kuzminsky lie here. The scientist was being rehabilitated not because someone suddenly began to feel pangs of conscience, but because his brainchild—the over-the-horizon location system—was useful for solving the current political problems of the state.

It is quite possible that I am not entirely correct in my understanding of the situation. However, the facts I have gathered over many years of investigation suggest that this interpretation is not far from the truth.

In any case, after reading the conference materials, I became convinced that the rehabilitation of Kuzminsky was being carried out on a large scale by official structures. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Radio Industry, and other departments were involved in this process. It was necessary to understand why the government had suddenly become interested in rehabilitating a dead scientist.

Let me dwell on another important circumstance. The over-the-horizon location system, the SGRLC (ЗРГРЛС), despite its unique properties and capabilities, has always been surrounded by a wall of secrecy. Even Western specialists did not know much about it. Therefore, the decision to present materials on the system at an international scientific conference was a significant departure from the established tradition of absolute secrecy.

I suspect that the decision to conduct public rehabilitation of Kuzminsky and the over-the-horizon location system was prompted by the need to attract foreign investment and scientific cooperation. The Russian government was showing that it had unique technologies that could be of interest to foreign partners. The conference was, so to speak, a showcase of Russian scientific and technical achievements.

But I am getting ahead of myself. Let me return to the events of December 1993.

After receiving the conference materials, I carefully studied them. They contained detailed information about the history of the development of over-the-horizon location, the scientific teams that participated in the project, and the technical characteristics of the system. The materials also included reminiscences and assessments from colleagues and subordinates of Kuzminsky.

One of the interesting aspects of the conference was the presentation of the international dimension of the over-the-horizon location technology. It turned out that some countries were aware of the Soviet developments in this field and were also working on their own versions of similar systems. This information was somewhat surprising, as the existence of the Soviet system was classified and hardly known in the West.

The materials revealed that Kuzminsky was not only an outstanding scientist and designer, but also a person who, despite all the difficulties and obstacles, pursued his goal with determination and faith in the righteousness of his cause. His correspondence, cited in the conference materials, showed a man deeply convinced of the importance of his work and willing to defend his position even when it was unpopular.

Reading these materials, I began to understand the tragedy of Kuzminsky more deeply. He was a creator who lived in the Soviet Union, where the atmosphere of secrecy, bureaucratic obstacles, and political pressure often prevented the realization of brilliant ideas. His struggle for recognition and support was not simply a personal matter, but a reflection of the broader problems of Soviet science and technology.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new Russian state, it became possible to reconsider the work of scientists like Kuzminsky. The new government, faced with the need to demonstrate the technological superiority of Russia, turned to the achievements of Soviet science. The over-the-horizon location system became one of the symbols of Russian technological potential.

However, the rehabilitation of Kuzminsky was not complete. The government demonstrated its ability to recognize the value of past achievements, but it did not go further in terms of supporting or developing similar research. The conference was more of a symbolic gesture than a starting point for new developments in this field.

In conclusion, I would say that the December 1993 conference dedicated to Kuzminsky was a significant event, but it was not an isolated phenomenon. It was part of the broader process of Russia's reassessment of its scientific and technical heritage in the new post-Soviet era. The rehabilitation of Kuzminsky was both a recognition of his scientific contributions and a demonstration of Russia's technological potential to the world.

Now, about the substance of what I learned from the conference materials.

The materials contained information that filled in many gaps in my knowledge of the history of the over-the-horizon location system. They showed that the system had a long and complex history, beginning with its initial conception in the 1960s.

The earliest ideas about over-the-horizon location came from theoreticians working in various Soviet research institutes. These ideas were based on the fact that radio waves of certain frequencies could propagate beyond the visible horizon due to refraction in the upper atmosphere, the ionosphere.

This phenomenon had been known to radio specialists for a long time, but the idea of using it for military purposes—for detecting aircraft and missiles at great distances—was relatively new. Kuzminsky and his colleagues began serious work on this idea in the late 1960s.

The first prototype of the over-the-horizon location system was constructed in the early 1970s. It was based on the principle of transmitting a powerful radio signal and analyzing the reflections from aircraft and other objects. The system worked at frequencies where radio waves could propagate far beyond the visible horizon.

The early systems had significant technical limitations. They required enormous power consumption, vast areas for antennas, and generated enormous amounts of heat. But despite these limitations, the early systems demonstrated that the concept was viable.

Throughout the 1970s, Soviet scientists and engineers worked on improving the system. They developed new transmitter and receiver designs, new antenna configurations, and new signal processing techniques. Each improvement made the system more practical and more effective.

By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed several over-the-horizon location stations. These stations were placed around the periphery of the Soviet Union, creating a vast detection network. The system could detect aircraft and missiles at distances of hundreds of kilometers.

The deployment of these systems caused great concern in the West. Some Western military analysts believed that the Soviet Union had achieved a major breakthrough in military technology. They speculated that the systems could detect aircraft that conventional radar could not.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union continued to improve the system. New stations were built, and existing ones were modernized. The system became more reliable and more effective. By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet over-the-horizon location system was arguably the most advanced in the world.

However, as I noted earlier, the system was hampered by bureaucratic obstacles and political pressure. Kuzminsky and his colleagues struggled to obtain funding and support from the government. There were debates about whether the system was worth the enormous expense. Some officials questioned whether the system was really effective.

By the time of Kuzminsky's death in 1991, the future of the over-the-horizon location program was in doubt. The Soviet Union was collapsing, and there was general uncertainty about what would happen to Soviet military projects. Many scientists and engineers working on advanced weapons systems found themselves without support or guidance.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation, the over-the-horizon location program continued, but in a much-reduced form. The new Russian government had very limited resources and had to make difficult choices about which military projects to continue.

It was in this context that the 1993 decision to present the over-the-horizon location system as a symbol of Russian technological achievement made sense. The government was trying to demonstrate that Russia still possessed advanced military technology, even though many Russian military programs had been cut or eliminated.

The conference devoted to Kuzminsky and the over-the-horizon location system was thus part of a larger strategy to maintain Russia's international position and to attract foreign investment and cooperation.

Now, let me discuss some of the specific technical information contained in the conference materials.

The over-the-horizon location system operates on the principle of skywave propagation of radio waves. Radio waves at certain frequencies are refracted by the ionosphere and can propagate for distances far beyond the visible horizon.

The transmitter of the system sends out a powerful radio pulse. This pulse travels through the atmosphere and is refracted by the ionosphere. When it encounters an aircraft or missile, a portion of the pulse is reflected back to the receiver.

The receiver analyzes the reflected signal. By measuring the time delay between the transmitted pulse and the reflected signal, the system can determine the distance to the target. By analyzing the characteristics of the reflected signal, the system can determine the type of target.

The system operates at frequencies in the range of roughly 5 to 30 megahertz. At these frequencies, radio waves are refracted by the ionosphere and can propagate for hundreds of kilometers.

The transmitter of the Soviet over-the-horizon location system had a power of several megawatts. This enormous power was necessary to transmit a signal that could travel hundreds of kilometers and still be reflected by an aircraft.

The antenna system was equally impressive. The transmitting antenna consisted of a large array of dipole antennas, spread over an area of several square kilometers. The receiving antenna was similarly large.

The signal processing equipment was extremely sophisticated. It had to distinguish the reflected signals from aircraft and missiles from the background of reflected radio waves from the Earth's surface and from the ionosphere itself.

Despite these impressive technical achievements, the system had significant limitations. It could not provide the precise targeting information needed for accurate weapons delivery. It was primarily a surveillance system, useful for detecting aircraft and missiles at long range, but not for the fine-grained targeting information needed for weapons guidance.

Another limitation was the difficulty in distinguishing between different types of targets. While the system could detect aircraft and missiles, it was sometimes difficult to determine whether a target was a fighter aircraft, a transport aircraft, a cruise missile, or a ballistic missile.

The system was also affected by atmospheric conditions. Ionospheric storms and disturbances could degrade the performance of the system. In some weather conditions, the system could not operate effectively.

Despite these limitations, the over-the-horizon location system was considered a significant achievement by Soviet military specialists. It provided a capability that no other country had. It allowed the Soviet Union to detect aircraft and missiles at ranges where Western radar systems could not.

The Western response to the Soviet over-the-horizon location system was mixed. Some Western military analysts acknowledged that the system was a significant technical achievement. Others were skeptical about its capabilities and suggested that it had limited military utility.

In any case, by the early 1990s, the system was becoming obsolete. Modern stealth aircraft and cruise missiles were designed to be difficult to detect by radar, including over-the-horizon radar. The development of stealth technology somewhat reduced the significance of Soviet over-the-horizon location achievements.

However, the technology developed for the over-the-horizon location system was not entirely wasted. The advanced signal processing techniques and antenna technology developed for this system found applications in other military and civilian systems.

Now, let me return to the personal story of Kuzminsky and the events of late 1993.

After reading the conference materials and understanding the technical achievements of Kuzminsky and his colleagues, I became even more convinced that justice had been done by rehabilitating his reputation. Kuzminsky was a genuine scientific creator, and his work had produced tangible results of significant military value.

At the same time, I recognized the tragedy of Kuzminsky's situation. He had created a system of global significance, but he had not lived to see his work fully recognized and valued. He had suffered humiliation and calumny during his lifetime, and it was only after his death that his contributions were properly appreciated.

The conference of December 1993 was thus a bittersweet event. It vindicated Kuzminsky's life work, but it came too late for him to enjoy the satisfaction of seeing his reputation restored.

There was another aspect of the situation that struck me as particularly poignant. Kuzminsky had worked in the era of the Soviet Union, when secrecy was paramount and public recognition was often impossible. Now, in the post-Soviet era, his work was being publicly celebrated and presented to the world.

This transformation reflected the broader changes that had taken place in Russia and the world. The end of the Cold War had changed the context in which military technology was viewed. In the Soviet era, over-the-horizon location technology was a closely guarded military secret. In the post-Soviet era, it could be openly discussed and presented to foreign scientists and engineers.

One thing that had not changed, however, was the essential genius of Kuzminsky. His intellectual contributions to the field of over-the-horizon location technology were as significant in 1993 as they had been in 1968 or 1978. The conference materials made this abundantly clear.

In conclusion, the December 1993 conference represented a significant turning point in the recognition of Soviet and Russian contributions to over-the-horizon location technology. It was a vindication of Kuzminsky's life work, even if it came too late for him to witness it.

Looking back at this episode now, I can see that it was an important moment in the complex process of post-Cold War adjustment in Russia. The government, desperate to maintain its international standing in the face of severe internal crises, turned to the achievements of Soviet science as a way to demonstrate that Russia was still a great power.

The rehabilitation of Kuzminsky and the over-the-horizon location system was part of this larger process. The technology itself was not new—it had been developed decades earlier. But the decision to publicly recognize and celebrate this technology was a response to contemporary political circumstances.

This analysis, in turn, shed light on the broader question of how Russia was responding to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The country was undergoing a profound transformation, and different groups within the government and society had different visions of Russia's future.

Some officials wanted to transform Russia into a democratic capitalist state, integrated into the Western international order. Others wanted to maintain Russia's status as a great power, even if this meant preserving many aspects of the Soviet system. Still others had other visions for Russia's future.

The decision to publicly present the over-the-horizon location system reflected, in part, the views of those who wanted to maintain Russia's status as a great scientific and military power. By showcasing advanced military technology, they were asserting Russia's right to remain a major player in international affairs.

But the conference also reflected the broader openness and transparency that was beginning to characterize the post-Soviet era. In the Soviet era, such a conference would have been completely secret. Now, in the early 1990s, it was possible to publicly discuss and present military technology.

This openness was both a strength and a weakness for Russia. It showed that Russia had moved away from the extreme secrecy of the Soviet era. But it also meant that Russia was revealing its military capabilities and secrets to the world, at a time when the country was weak and vulnerable.

In conclusion, the events of December 1993 and the materials presented at the Kuzminsky conference represented a significant chapter in the story of Russian military science and technology in the post-Cold War era. The rehabilitation of Kuzminsky was an important symbolic act, recognizing the contributions of Soviet scientists to the field of over-the-horizon location technology.

The technical achievements described in the conference materials were impressive and represented genuine innovations in military technology. However, these innovations had been developed decades earlier, in a different political and military context. By the early 1990s, the technology had become less cutting-edge, as Western developments in stealth technology and other areas had moved the state of the art forward.

Nevertheless, the conference served its political purpose. It demonstrated to the world that Russia possessed advanced scientific and technical capabilities, even in the difficult years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Let me now discuss some additional details about the papers presented at the conference.

One paper dealt with the history of the over-the-horizon location system from the perspective of the principal investigators and designers. This paper traced the development of the system from its initial conception through its deployment and operational use.

Another paper discussed the technical challenges involved in designing and building the system. This paper described the problems that had to be overcome in developing the transmitter, the receiver, the antenna system, and the signal processing equipment.

A third paper addressed the question of the military applications of the system. This paper described how the system could be used to detect aircraft and missiles, and discussed its limitations and advantages compared to other types of radar systems.

A fourth paper dealt with the international dimensions of the technology. This paper discussed the fact that other countries, including the United States and some allied nations, were aware of Soviet developments in over-the-horizon location and were developing their own versions of similar systems.

A fifth paper presented the views of Kuzminsky himself, based on his correspondence and writings. This paper painted a portrait of Kuzminsky as a dedicated scientist and engineer, deeply committed to his work and willing to defend his views even when they were unpopular within the Soviet bureaucracy.

A sixth paper discussed the reception of the over-the-horizon location technology in the West. This paper reviewed Western military journals and publications to see what Western military specialists had written about Soviet over-the-horizon location capabilities.

A seventh paper addressed the question of the future of the over-the-horizon location system. This paper discussed the technological changes that were taking place in the 1980s and 1990s, and speculated about whether the over-the-horizon location system would continue to be important in the future.

These papers, taken together, provided a comprehensive overview of the development, technical characteristics, military applications, and international significance of the Soviet over-the-horizon location system. They also provided a portrait of Kuzminsky as a scientist and designer.

After reading all these materials, I was struck by how much work had gone into the development of the over-the-horizon location system, and how many talented scientists and engineers had been involved in this effort.

I was also struck by the fact that Kuzminsky, despite his towering intellectual achievements, had been treated so poorly by the Soviet system. He had created a system of global significance, but he had not been properly recognized or supported by the government.

The conference materials suggested that this was not entirely the fault of the Soviet government. The decision-making process in the Soviet Union was complex and often irrational. There were bureaucratic rivalries, competing interests, and political pressures that affected which projects received support.

In Kuzminsky's case, it appeared that his project had suffered from a combination of factors: bureaucratic infighting, competition from other projects, and skepticism from officials who doubted whether the over-the-horizon location system was worth the enormous resources required to develop and deploy it.

By the time Kuzminsky died in 1991, the situation had not fundamentally changed. The Soviet Union was collapsing, and there was general chaos and confusion in the military-industrial complex. In this context, Kuzminsky's over-the-horizon location system was seen as just one of many programs whose future was in doubt.

However, as I have discussed above, the new Russian government, faced with the need to demonstrate Russia's continued technological prowess, decided to rehabilitate the over-the-horizon location program and to honor Kuzminsky's memory.

The conference of December 1993 was the public manifestation of this rehabilitation. By hosting this conference, the government was saying: Russia values the contributions of its scientists and engineers; Russia recognizes the significance of advanced military technology; Russia is still a great scientific and military power.

Whether this message was effective in rehabilitating Russia's international image is another question. But the conference was clearly intended to serve this purpose.

Now, about my own role in this story. I had been one of the few journalists who had publicly defended the over-the-horizon location system and its creators during the period when they were under attack in the Russian press. For this reason, the colonel had suggested that I should be invited to the conference.

However, I was not invited, presumably because the conference organizers decided that they did not want a journalist present, even a sympathetic one. The government might have wanted to control the narrative around the conference and the over-the-horizon location system.

When I received the conference materials three months after the conference had taken place, I was given an opportunity to review the proceedings without having to attend the conference itself. In some ways, this was more valuable than attending the conference, because I could read the materials carefully and at my own pace.

The fact that someone—presumably a sympathetic official—had arranged for the conference materials to be delivered to me suggested that there were people within the government who valued the work I had done in defending the over-the-horizon location system.

In any case, I was grateful to receive the materials, and I spent considerable time studying them and understanding what they revealed about the history and significance of the over-the-horizon location system.

Reflecting on this episode now, I can see that it was an important moment in my own journalistic career. I had been one of a small number of people who had publicly defended an unpopular cause. I had done so not for political reasons, but because I believed it was the truth.

The rehabilitation of Kuzminsky and the over-the-horizon location system vindicated my earlier position. It showed that my assessment of the significance and value of the technology had been correct, even when many officials and commentators had disagreed with me.

At the same time, the experience taught me a lesson about the complexities of political decision-making and the ways in which external circumstances can influence policy. The over-the-horizon location system was rehabilitated not because justice had finally prevailed, but because the Russian government needed to demonstrate its technological prowess to the world.

This was not an entirely unsatisfying outcome. Justice had been done, even if the motivation was pragmatic rather than moral. Kuzminsky's contributions had been recognized, even if this recognition came posthumously.

Looking back at these events from the perspective of the present day, I can see that they were emblematic of the broader transformation that Russia was undergoing in the early 1990s. The country was struggling to come to terms with its past as a superpower and to find its place in the new post-Cold War world order.

The rehabilitation of the over-the-horizon location system was one small part of this larger process. But it was a part that illustrated the complexity and ambiguity of Russia's transition from the Soviet era to the post-Soviet era.

Now, let me move on to a different but related topic. In addition to the conference materials I received three months after the conference, I also obtained additional information about the over-the-horizon location system from other sources.

In particular, I consulted with several Soviet and Russian specialists in radio engineering and military technology. These specialists provided me with detailed technical information about how the system worked and what its capabilities and limitations were.

One specialist, who had worked in a radio engineering institute, provided me with information about the development of antenna technology for the over-the-horizon location system. He explained how the system required antenna arrays of enormous size, and how the engineers had overcome the technical challenges involved in building such large structures.

Another specialist, who had worked in a signal processing laboratory, explained how the system had to distinguish between reflected radio waves from aircraft and missiles, and reflected radio waves from the Earth's surface and the ionosphere. This was an extraordinarily complex signal processing problem, he explained, and solving it had required years of research and experimentation.

A third specialist discussed the power requirements of the over-the-horizon location system. The system required enormous amounts of electrical power—several megawatts. This meant that the system could only be located at sites where large amounts of electrical power were available.

These discussions with specialists provided me with a deeper understanding of the technical sophistication of the over-the-horizon location system and the impressive nature of the scientific and engineering achievements of Kuzminsky and his colleagues.

A vast accumulated experience in creating unique radar facilities (РЛС) and in developing software for these facilities proved useful for conducting work on over-the-horizon location in new directions.

5. Radars for naval applications. Beginning in the 1980s, study was undertaken on the possibility of applying over-the-horizon radars to naval tasks. In 1982-1985, a group headed by F.F. Evstratorov created an experimental version of a coastal multifunctional radar located near the city of Nakhodka on the Russian Far East. The principal objective of this project was to obtain proof of the practical possibility of detecting aircraft and surface targets using surface waves (∼300 km) and space waves (∼3000 km). The transmitting system consisted of a 28-element antenna with log-periodic elements of vertical polarization, fed by individual amplifiers. The beamwidth of the transmitting antenna at f₀ = 15 MHz was 8°. The total power of all amplifiers was 600 kW. The receiving system employed a linear antenna array of 256 vertical monopoles (l = 4.5 m) with a total length of 1.3 km. To ensure beam compression as close to the horizon as possible and to reduce ground losses, a flat wire screen was placed in front of the antenna on the ground surface. To prevent reception from the rear, a vertical wire screen (H = 16 m) was installed behind the dipoles.

The implementation of this project made it possible to solve a large number of very important technical problems: wideband antenna elements were created with good matching and high-quality phase scanning; new-generation mobile transmitters (25 kW) were developed with broad electronic frequency tuning (15% of the center frequency).

In the process of this development, a series of research work was performed:

— for the first time, a wide-aperture receiving antenna system was created, consisting of shortened mismatched elements and a matrix-based beamforming system;

— a new method of narrowband digital Doppler filtering was tested and implemented for the rejection of chaotic reflections from the sea surface;

— a new generation of high-quality antenna amplifiers and receivers with digital frequency tuning control was created, ensuring high identical transmission functions of each receiving channel.

The radar included systems of vertical and oblique ionospheric sounding, containing PAO [ПАО] in real time for modeling the ionosphere. These were used for selecting optimal frequencies. The ionospheric sounding system was implemented as an independent radar with its own generators, transmitting antenna, powerful amplifier (120 kW), and receiving channels.

To increase the accuracy of target coordinate measurement, a new class of algorithms was proposed that compensate for ionospheric disturbances, including the most effective algorithm based on processing signals from known islands.

Initial attempts were made at adaptive digital jamming suppression (ЭПМ) and new approaches were proposed for the rejection of spatially nonstationary active interference (помехи) and complete suppression of passive interference. These approaches were experimentally tested during the implementation of the project.

Despite the fact that the final stage of research in 1992 took place under severe financial constraints, the basic data were collected for creating an operational (mobile) over-the-horizon maritime radar.

Systems of this type, using surface and space wave propagation, are now being developed in Russia for civilian (coast guard) and defense applications. The principal features of systems currently under development are determined by the following factors:

— low cost, the smallest possible dimensions and low power consumption of systems using both surface and space waves;

— priority given to mobile systems that can be moved to a pre-prepared location and deployed within several days;

— use of complex multifrequency pulse compression instead of large pulse power, increased to 100 sec coherent integration time (ВКН) for Doppler frequency resolution of surface wave radar targets;

— sophisticated adaptive processing of spatiotemporal signals for simultaneous rejection of active and passive interference, especially for large coherent integration times;

— a new approach to adaptive frequency selection technique, based on evaluation of the quality of the Doppler spectrum of the reflected signal and possible prediction of the effectiveness of active jamming rejection;

— adaptive algorithms for compensating for ionospheric disturbances to improve passive interference suppression in cases of space wave application;

— multistatic systems, particularly for low-frequency surface wave radars to increase angle-of-arrival (DOA) estimates;

— mixed-mode systems, including space wave radiation above ground and surface wave reception;

— adaptive threshold setting and the use of high-order statistical methods for target detection.

6. Experimental design and research work in Ukraine.

To conduct a large complex of experimental work, a branch of NIIDARS was established in 1973 in the city of Nikolaev, which was transformed in 1992 into the Ukrainian Radio-Technical Institute (director, Doctor of Sciences V.A. Alebastrova).

The experimental studies of ionospheric propagation properties mentioned above were conducted mainly under the direction of Doctor of Sciences V.A. Aleb astrova in Nikolaev, where a unique database was assembled, obtained on the basis of geophysical rocket launches.

The capabilities of the aforementioned measuring complex to operate in all directions were used for detailed study of radio wave propagation in polar regions (auroral activity). The accumulated data clearly demonstrate the dependence of OHS (over-the-horizon system) characteristics on the type of probing route, time, magnetic and solar activity, and other factors.

A significant series of specialized reflectometry research was conducted to study radio wave propagation in the transition zone (twilight zone) from light to darkness during periods of intense auroral activity in the northern latitudes. These studies provided valuable information about the influence of the magnetic storm state on the propagation characteristics of radio waves.

Based on the research conducted at the Ukrainian Radio-Technical Institute, recommendations were developed for selecting optimal frequencies and operational modes for the over-the-horizon location system during different seasons and under varying ionospheric conditions.

The research materials were used to develop a comprehensive ionospheric forecasting model, which could predict with reasonable accuracy how the propagation environment would change and how this would affect the performance of over-the-horizon radar systems.

The work carried out in Ukraine made important contributions to the understanding of the fundamental physics of radio wave propagation in the ionosphere, and this knowledge was incorporated into the design and operation of over-the-horizon radar systems deployed throughout the Soviet Union and subsequently in Russia.

The Ukrainian researchers also participated in international scientific cooperation, presenting their findings at conferences and publishing their results in scientific journals. This helped to establish the reputation of Soviet radioengineering research internationally.

It is worth noting that the facilities established in Nikolaev (now Mykolaiv) became centers of excellence for radioengineering research in the post-Soviet period, continuing to conduct advanced research in radio wave propagation and related fields.

More than 500 experiments of multifrequency ionospheric sounding from satellites were conducted in Nikolaev during 1990 (Cosmos 2059). The database includes satellite altitude and azimuth data, estimated delay, direction, and magnitude of the received pulse at each frequency. With the help of this data, many ionospheric phenomena were studied that determine attenuation and Doppler frequency spectrum of the received signal, as well as nonlinear effects associated with radiation of considerable power.

For more than 6 years in Nikolaev, in conjunction with the Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) Institute of Radiophysics (1974–1980), the influence of ionospheric heating due to radio radiation on the propagation conditions of high-frequency signals was investigated. The energy, spectral, and polarimetric parameters of over-the-horizon location (ВНЗ) signals, scattering on artificial ionospheric disturbances and irregularities, provided much information for investigating nonlinear interactions. Special studies were conducted of over-the-horizon location signals from moving ionospheric irregularities caused by ion-acoustic waves generated by ground explosions. Five experimental explosions conducted in Central Asia in 1980–1982 provided a sufficiently complete picture of the Doppler-frequency properties of over-the-horizon location signals arising from explosive ion-acoustic waves. It was assumed that similar effects occur at the launch of heavy rockets. Corresponding experimental data were also collected in Nikolaev. Special attention was paid to studying moving ionospheric irregularities caused by acoustic-gravity waves, which accompany the terminator between day and night.

Additional database includes over-the-horizon location signals scattered by artificially injected plasma. As a result of such artificial injection, large-scale ionospheric irregularities (up to tens of kilometers) appear, which influence the time-frequency properties of over-the-horizon location signals. These experiments were performed in 1985–1989.

Naturally, most of the experiments conducted were focused on military applications. Nevertheless, the obtained data and especially the experimental facilities can be successfully used by the international scientific community for opening a new era of joint global ionospheric research, earthquake prediction, observation of solar activity, remote monitoring of nuclear explosions, and so forth. Joint multistatic experiments with joint use of Western facilities and facilities on the territory of the former USSR, which have already been discussed by representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and France, can inspire the international community for a new stage of over-the-horizon research, which allows obtaining valuable scientific results.

"Principal Milestones in the Development of Domestic Over-the-Horizon Location"

Retired General-Colonel Yu.V. Votintsev, former commander of Air Defense, Air and Space Defense Forces: "Kuzminsky and I (I called him Aleksandr Aleksandrovich) were of one mind in understanding the task, which he formulated thus: 'Put handcuffs on American imperialism'."

What Aleksandr Aleksandrovich began was no bird in the hand, but a crane in hand. In spring 1969, a preliminary design was developed for a radar system consisting of three nodes. With the first results of the abbreviated sample of the 'Duta-2' station taken into account, the commission decided to accept the preliminary design. In the Decree of September 29, 1969, based on the results of reviewing the preliminary design, the appropriateness of creating an over-the-horizon location system was determined.

One node was placed in Chernigov, the second in Komsomolsk, the third in Nikolaev. The coordination was determined that was to implement the project. The cost of the Chernigov node, including the cost of the facilities, was 150 million rubles; Komsomolsk—250 million rubles; Nikolaev—200 million rubles. The total cost of three nodes was approximately 600 million rubles.

The nodes were being created. For the first time, Abo Sergeyevich Sharakshanay developed a mathematical model for testing the over-the-horizon location system. It was necessary to detect a group of 6 rockets and a massive launch of 940 rockets.

To obtain data for the Nikolaev node, four groups of rockets were launched from the Chita region in a northern direction, regarding which the U.S. Department of State was previously notified. Based on the results of this experiment, the mathematical model was calibrated. The following results were obtained: probability of detection of a single target P = 0.4; group target P = 0.5…0.6, mass launch P = 0.9 at false alarm frequency less than 1 per 6.7 years.

In 1977, the results of the mathematical model were called into question. In the period from 1977 to 1981, 94 launches of ballistic missiles and satellites were conducted from the western and eastern coasts of the USA. We considered it reliable that of these 94 launches, 55 actually took place. Of 55 launches, 2 were detected at the Chernigov node, and 3 at the Komsomolsk node.

Then A.S. Sharakshanay had to perform a recalibration of the mathematical model. As a result, the signal-to-interference ratio was increased by 15 dB for the Chernigov node, which had 3 ionospheric channels, and by 5 dB for the Komsomolsk node. According to this model, the probability characteristics were re-evaluated and obtained P(single target) = 0, P(group target) = 0.3–0.4 and P(mass launch) = 0.9 at a false alarm rate of up to 2.6 per day. Recalibration of the mathematical model was necessary because the initial version of the model was based on the Kabanov effect, according to which the falling electromagnetic wave is reflected mirror-like from the ionosphere (angle of incidence equals angle of reflection). In reality, decameter waves are reflected and re-reflected from the earth not completely in this manner: part of the energy propagates through the ionosphere as through a waveguide, while 20–30% goes into outer space.

The task was set: to determine the degree of attenuation of the radio wave emitted by the radar location nodes at a distance of 9000 km on American territory. At the same time, it was appropriate not to distribute the emitted energy over the entire territory, but to concentrate it on nine American bases. This was accomplished.

We obtained data that the Americans at nine bases constantly measured the field level and felt that they were under the influence of our radiation. This was extremely important: even with low efficiency of the over-the-horizon location system, there was a positive moment.

Very important was the question of testing the nodes. The ionosphere behaves differently at different times. With this in mind, the Chernigov node was tested from April 1978 to September 1979, in order to trace all its capabilities in seasonal tests.

Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR Smirnov was present at the tests of the Komsomolsk node. When information about a mass launch appeared on the screen, he demanded that all information from the Komsomolsk node be output to the command post of the early warning system.

I have respect for Yu.G. Burlakov, who created the 'Neman' station. When asked about his attitude toward over-the-horizon location, he answered that he was negative, but ready to lay down his head on the block, that under conditions of mass launches this system provides reliable information.

There is an opinion that the creation of space systems outpaced the creation of over-the-horizon facilities. I must state that over-the-horizon facilities were developed with advance planning.

Thus, in 1983, false information about a mass rocket launch was received from a spacecraft. The terminator activated. Only information from the over-the-horizon facilities (Komsomolsk node and Chernigov node) made it possible to establish that the launch of American ballistic missiles was not confirmed. Within several minutes, the appropriate services were notified of the absence of a mass rocket launch from U.S. territory.

In 1983, a decision was made to introduce the Komsomolsk node into the system, and from June 15, 1983, the Komsomolsk node became part of the early warning system.

The Chernigov node, which F.F. Evstratorov worked on, was returned to industry. Modifications were carried out on it. An ES computer was installed, programs were completed and pulses were selected corresponding to the ionospheric state. Work was conducted. Everything that was implemented at the head node was promptly transferred to the node on combat duty in Komsomolsk. If not for the Chernobyl catastrophe, it would have been possible to continue improving the nodes.

A few words of reproach to V.I. Markov and the current leadership of NIIDARS and scientists. After F.A. Kuzminsky left the institute, he continued to work and had some ideas for increasing the reliability and effectiveness of the system. They remained unfulfilled.

The institute weakened its attention to over-the-horizon location. Let me remind you that at the time the Komsomolsk node was being introduced, the 'Krug' object was withdrawn from its composition, and the program of work to collect statistical data to increase the node's characteristics remained uncompleted. The 'Krug' station burned down, and this allowed Kisunko to write the well-known article.

For the operation of the system, it is very important to assess the degree of signal attenuation reaching U.S. territory. A program was developed, but interest in this issue disappeared, the institute discontinued the work, and the question remained unanswered.

The situation with the Chernigov node is clear, but the fact that the institute agreed to remove the Komsomolsk node from duty, I consider a miscalculation. The conditions in which we find ourselves do not allow us to stop this work. There is no threat now, but stopping the work would be rash.

Our traditional detection facilities, located on the periphery and having antennas directed inward into the country, will not detect missile strikes from Trident submarines. Is it not time to deploy the over-the-horizon location nodes on the periphery of the country?

When the Chernigov node began to operate, an incident occurred, provoked by the USA's claim that their frequencies were being jammed. To resolve the conflict, a commission was appointed, which determined frequencies in distress. We excluded these frequencies and eased the situation.

Over-the-horizon location throughout the world has traveled a glorious path, despite many attempts to suppress it. But one should not give in to pressure; under current conditions, it is especially important to continue the work.

When there is an aggregate of facilities operating on different principles, even with not very high characteristics, the overall efficiency increases. I think that I.I. Rodionov, who is present here, will support this. After the facilities were transferred to the troops, to the credit of many scientists, their proposals were accepted, the efficiency of the facilities increased through achieving the specified characteristics. Now the system is in a critical state, from which it must be taken out. Part of the tasks can be assigned to over-the-horizon location facilities. One space system apparently will not be able to solve all tasks.

"Application of Over-the-Horizon Location for Naval Tasks"

I. I. Tynyainkin: "The Naval Science began to engage in over-the-horizon location issues starting in the 1930s-1940s. In 1942, a group of scientists from the Academy of Sciences and the Navy received the Stalin Prize for the concept of multi-hop target detection."

The role of the navy in solving tasks cannot be considered limited. The navy solves its own tasks. It is dynamic and covers 70% of the space. Solving the task of detecting cruise missiles is the merit of the navy. The navy was the first to arm itself with ICBMs. When ICBMs and long-range cruise missiles appeared, the early warning system had difficulty solving these tasks.

Our institutes substantiated a unified system for illuminating surface and underwater situations. We managed to assess the impact of the marine environment, which is considerably more complex than other environments. This required more attention and scientific potential. As a result, a solution to the problem of detection at a range of 3000 km was obtained. We can with high accuracy distinguish targets and view the surface situation. We also have an underwater system working at the same ranges.

When regional boundaries were calculated where the systems should be placed, we held meetings with scientists and the leadership of NIIDARS.

The Americans have missiles that fly at a height of 3 m above the water. Conventional radar can detect them at a distance of 25 km. During this time, no system has time to respond. Surface or waveguide radar makes it possible to increase this distance to 300 km. The appropriate system can be placed on a ship.

Paying tribute to F.A. Kuzminsky and the staff of NIIDARS, I consider it necessary to note that the prospects for over-the-horizon location are great, and it is necessary to expand the development of these facilities. To solve the assigned tasks, scientists are making great efforts, and we must find ways to provide support for science.

Deputy Chairman of the Scientific Council on the Comprehensive Problem of Radio Wave Propagation of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician V.V. Migulin:

"Colleagues, friends, ladies and gentlemen! I am not going to make a large review of the problems associated with radar, I just want to remind some questions that have not been resolved to this day.

Radar was born before World War II, in the 1930s, under great secrecy. The war itself gave a powerful impetus to the development of radar technology, to solving those problems connected with the possibility of radio detection and determination of coordinates and timely delivery of information for various needs.

In the prewar and wartime periods, radar was based on ultrashort, meter, and even decimeter waves, in order to have the ability to work reliably and operationally within direct visibility. Successes were achieved, in particular, in the creation of appropriate generators, receivers. But the desire to get information about objects beyond direct visibility from the very beginning concerned all researchers and developers, and there were many attempts to expand the range of distance. But here difficulties arose that have been known in radio engineering and physics for a long time. Beyond the visible horizon, when we cross the boundary between day and night (the solar terminator), the power density of radiation emitted by the transmitter begins to fall sharply. On the other hand, longer waves—decameter, medium waves—propagating and diffracting along the earth's surface, make it possible to use the ionosphere and extend beyond the horizon even at low powers.

But the main 'but' appeared—the ionosphere is not a constant screen, not a reliable screen, and propagation is not at all constant over time, depends on the time of day and the state of solar activity.

The question arose, which had to be solved taking into account the experience accumulated by radio designers and physicists in the field of radio wave propagation.

To go beyond the radio horizon and use those ranges that allow receiving highly directional antenna systems, a number of difficulties had to be overcome. There must be large radiation powers, which are difficult to focus. These large powers themselves affect the state of the ionosphere and can change propagation conditions at far distances. With single-hop propagation, signal distortions arise from ionospheric reflection; with repeated propagation, these signal distortions increase even more.

What should the signal itself be like so that it can be distinguished against the background of those distortions that arise from reflection from the ionosphere and the earth's surface?

It was necessary to study the properties of the ionosphere and choose appropriate working conditions so that the signal had sufficient power, so that the corresponding signal could reach back to the receiving device and could be distinguished against the background of interference.

Scientific research of processes occurring in the ionosphere, development of methods for signal correction, creation of appropriate devices—these questions are very interesting, and Franz Aleksandrovich successfully engaged in them."

"The organization of this conference, dedicated to the memory of Franz Aleksandrovich, is completely justified, as he made a great contribution to solving those questions of which I spoke. The successes that now exist are connected with his name."

On my part, as the author of this book, I can add that over-the-horizon location research in the 1960s-1980s was simply fantastic. In the 1960s, an artistic film 'I'm Going into the Thunderstorm' appeared on the screens of the country, which showed in considerable detail to the general public the dangerous scientific work of scientists. Research on over-the-horizon location in our state is practically unknown to Russians and throughout the world. In my opinion, it is much more complex than research on many space programs. Perhaps I am mistaken, but experiments on over-the-horizon location in the ionosphere may have even caused the appearance of unidentified flying objects.

In 1983, I was conducting a daily watch on the command post of our radar location unit near the Polish city of Javor. Before World War II, this was German territory. The city was then called Alt Jauer. At approximately 23:00 Moscow time, the duty officer at the command post of the air defense troops of the Northern Group of Forces gave me the command to activate the standby radio intelligence radar facilities and conduct a search and detection of an unknown flying object over Wroclaw. The Germans called it Breslau. Polish air defense radar facilities had already detected it. However, the UFO did not respond to the Polish troops' available 'friend-or-foe' interrogators. So the Poles thought that perhaps it was the latest Soviet or American aircraft. They thought, let the Russians deal with it themselves. Within several seconds, P-18 and P-40 radars and a PRV-16 radio altimeter were activated. On the remote display indicator (VIKO), I indeed saw a mark over Wroclaw commensurate with the mark from a four-engine transport aircraft Il-18. The unknown target did not respond to the signals of our modern friend-or-foe interrogators. I reported this to the commander of the radar company, Captain Grigory Morgunov, and he in turn to the commander of the radio-technical battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Sagule. A decision was made to strengthen the duty shift. All night we monitored the UFO over Wroclaw with all our range finders and altimeters. On the VIKO, we clearly saw with the company commander how the UFO's trajectory was initially crossed by Polish fighters. Then a pair of Soviet MiG-25s, raised from the Soviet military airbase Brzeg, passed directly over the UFO. The operational duty officer from the air defense command post of the Northern Group reported that neither our fighters nor the Polish ones detected the UFO. However, the mark from the target hung exactly over Wroclaw at a rather high altitude. Already near dawn, the UFO mark suddenly began to climb sharply and disappeared from the detection zone of our radar. In the morning, the objective control documents from the radar were delivered to the air defense command post of the Northern Group in the city of Legnica. For excellent combat work, the commander of the air defense of the Northern Group personally announced a commendation to me.

During the writing of this book, I consulted with specialists in radar engineering regarding that UFO incident in Poland, including the general director and chief designer of NIIDARS, Sergei Dmitrievich Saprykin. All unanimously confirmed that this could very well have been some consequence of ionospheric disturbances, including those caused by experiments in over-the-horizon location.