Chapter 6 — The General Created Scientific Research Center 'Vympel'

Original: Глава 6 «Генерал создал ЦНПО «Вымпел»

In late September 1990, the streets and squares of Moscow were seething with the heat of political passions. Almost daily, various political parties—arising as if at a magician's touch—representing the most diverse directions and platforms held rallies and demonstrations. One morning, while heading to work at the journal, on a small patch of ground before the exit from Begovaya Metro Station onto Khoroshyovskoye Highway, a well-dressed elderly gentleman, clutching a newspaper in his hand—probably to add more impact to his speech—was calling for votes in the Supreme Soviet USSR elections for some colonel general (general-polkovnik). Amid the noise of the small crowd, I could make out only the military rank of the candidate for people's deputy. Young men and women were distributing leaflets, probably describing the life story of the military commander. I was not interested in either the candidate himself or his pre-election platform.

—Probably one of those military retirees, former servicemen, whom certain forces decided to make into a puppet politician,— the thought flashed through my mind.

That day I had my own concerns. I absolutely had to call the former deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry (Minrradiopromy), retired General-Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanovich Markov, and try to arrange a meeting with him. The journalistic investigation into the over-the-horizon radar location was clearly dragging on. Some vague fears were arising that delay in preparing this material was clearly not in my favor. After all, I had been serving in the journal for only a few months. I still needed to establish myself in journalistic work, so that the military journalism aces in the editorial office would recognize me as a specialist and would henceforth respect my opinion in the office, and respect me as both an officer and simply as a person.

Otherwise, the work would be nothing but tedium and emotional anguish. With roughly such thoughts, I entered the editorial office that day. My bad premonitions proved justified.

After the morning editorial meeting, the head of the department, Colonel Nekrylov, somewhat casually but tactfully asked about the preparation of the material on the OTRH (over-the-horizon radar station). In doing so, he looked at me as if testing me.

—Of course, the OTRH theme is complex, I understand,— said the colonel, —but over the past three months you have not published any notable materials marked by the editorial board. Other young journalists have already prepared notable publications that were noted by the editorial board and leadership. What are you sitting there doing, getting bogged down with your over-the-horizon radar?

It was pointless to argue with the head of the department. And yet I objected that the notable publications of young journalists were either compilations of already-known newspaper and journal publications about repressed military leaders or simply journalistic hackwork, carelessly prepared, hastily written pieces.

The brief conversation with the head of the department was unexpected and unpleasant for me. During the several months I had spent in the editorial office, as a journalist I had generally not faced any complaints. But the head of the department's remarks were clearly critical.

—It's no accident that Nekrylov rubbed my face in it today, oh no accident at all,— I mused under the clatter of the colonel's typewriter, —probably the journal leadership is discussing the work of young journalists in a narrow circle, and some are pushing for me to be removed. That's the only explanation.

The unpleasant conversation with the head of the department and the rather gloomy thoughts it inspired did not dispose me toward work. But there were obligations. I had to continue the investigation. I opened my notebook. I looked for the telephone number of retired General-Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanovich Markov.

—I'm listening, Markov,— came a rather authoritative male voice through the receiver.

I introduced myself, who I was and what I wanted from the retired general, the deputy minister of radio industry and director of a major defense scientific research institute.

—I've already been told that Franz Kuzminskiy came to visit you at the editorial office,— Markov answered immediately, —if you need a meeting with me, come to my apartment.

General-Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanovich Markov, retired former deputy minister of radio industry of the USSR, former head of the Scientific Research Center 'Vympel' (TSNPO 'Vympel') and the Scientific Research Institute for Distant Air Detection (NIIDAD), gave his home address, date, and time of the meeting. This was a favorable response.

—Well, actually, it's even better that Markov knows about Kuzminskiy's visit,— thoughts arose in me, —and what of it if the former chief designer told about his problems. Probably Markov is accustomed to such situations. In any case, I've taken the first step toward the truth.

I had an acquaintance, Colonel Vladimir Ivanov, in the Directorate of the Armaments Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense. We happened to meet by chance at the central sanatorium of the Ministry of Defense in the Georgian town of Borjomi.

The telephone lines of one of the main directorates of the Ministry of Defense were under surveillance by the military counterintelligence of the KGB. So I called and suggested to Vladimir Ivanov, without any explanation, to meet in a prestigious restaurant on Lenin Prospect.

—Around here they say that he didn't want to cede first place to anyone in over-the-horizon radar work,— said Vladimir Ivanov, somewhat tipsy.

—But what, are the Americans also developing over-the-horizon radars?— I asked the colonel, —Then why does the newspaper 'Soviet Russia' claim that Americans threw us the idea for a combat over-the-horizon system?

—Americans threw us the OTRH idea?— Ivanov snorted. Come on, stop believing such nonsense! Do you think people across the ocean don't understand the advantages of such a combat system?— Ivanov said, and at the same time with his glass he gestured dismissively.

The next day, from an acquaintance who managed a wine store near the editorial office, in exchange for a gift of the book 'The Thorn Birds,' which was scarce at that time, I bought several bottles of Czech beer, which was in acute shortage, and some Black Sea dried fish from my brother's parcel.

I carried the briefcase with the 'precious' fermented beverage on the metro very carefully. I kept gripping the handle tightly the whole time, because metro passengers often don't notice those coming toward them and just forge ahead. But everything went fine. Reaching the meeting place, I found Colonel Ivanov already waiting.

—Well, Alexander,— Vladimir smiled, —you're simply a magician, where did you find such luxury in the capital?— with obvious pleasure he examined the bottles of Czech beer in my briefcase.

He handed me a newspaper with a thick package of standard typewritten sheets inserted in it. And into his briefcase went the beer bottles and some of the Black Sea dried fish from my brother's parcel.

—Maybe we could sit somewhere and chat over this magnificence,— suggested the colonel and tapped his briefcase. —Or, we could head to my place, where I have a bottle of 'Stolichnaya' sweating in the refrigerator?

In the evening I read the materials that Colonel Ivanov had given me. They clearly demonstrated the falsity of the claims by 'Soviet Russia' that 'adventurists who picked up the idea from abroad succeeded in creating a combat over-the-horizon system.' The materials showed that it was fundamentally wrong.

The American company 'General Electric' concluded a contract to develop an experimental over-the-horizon radar (OTRH) of reciprocal sounding OTH-B with electronic systems control (ESD) for the U.S. Air Force only in the mid-1970s, when American military specialists had already accumulated considerable theoretical and practical experience in over-the-horizon radio location.

At the receiving position, the antenna had a length of 1,170 meters and was terminated by 82 modules of the receiving device. A gigantic antenna array was connected to the receivers by hundreds of kilometers of coaxial cable. There was also a transmitting position with its own antenna array and transmitters.

The analysis of the materials provided by Colonel Ivanov involuntarily led to the thought that in the newspaper 'Soviet Russia' the well-known scientist and designer intentionally made an error, accusing the Soviet creators of over-the-horizon systems of 'picking up ideas from abroad.'

Almost a year of tests of the newest super-radar for the U.S. Air Force. American military aircraft simulated raids of Soviet combat aviation. The radar at a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers from the coast of Maine successfully detected aircraft and transmitted target designation to fighter-interceptors.

In the American Air Force, tests of the highly complex and expensive OTRH were considered quite successful. However, to resolve all organizational questions and, above all, financial ones, the beginning of construction of the combat system was delayed until 1977.

In Ivanov's materials it was noted that the first stage of a combat system for over-the-horizon detection of aircraft targets in the interests of air defense of the North American continent (USA and Canada) would include two over-the-horizon stations: one in Maine and one on the Pacific coast.

After tests of the first stage of the American combat OTRH in Maine with a review sector of 60 degrees, which already provided reasonably reliable coverage of U.S. territory in that region, construction began of another, more powerful station with a 120-degree sector of view.

The Americans placed the second OTRH on the West Coast. Its view sector was immediately designed for 180 degrees. The transmitting position was located in Oregon at an air base near Christmas Valley. The receiving position was located in California.

In the materials given to me there were also American empirical data on the effect of the ionosphere on the propagation of short radio waves and, accordingly, on the operational characteristics of combat OTHRs. An attentive reader could see that the Americans had long been conducting complex theoretical and experimental research on this problem.

Moving somewhat ahead in my journalistic investigation, I should note that in 2000, several pages of text that was clearly intelligence information were given to me by one of the senior officers of Russia's Ministry of Defense. This information showed that the Americans achieved detection ranges of up to 4,000 kilometers and successfully used their OTHRs during military operations.

So compared to American expenditures, the expenditures on the creation of Soviet over-the-horizon stations were significantly smaller. But the USA brought its national OTRH system, so to speak, to perfection. And in the Soviet Union, despite enormous scientific and technical efforts, the systems did not reach the desired effectiveness.

The Americans proved far more cunning and far-sighted than some Soviet and later Russian military and politicians in the over-the-horizon race. As early as 1991, they tested their OTHRs in real combat operations during the operation to liberate Kuwait, where they successfully detected and tracked Iraqi aircraft at ranges of thousands of kilometers.

Thanks to my connections in the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Armaments Chief's apparatus, I managed to obtain in autumn 1990 considerable information that was clearly not intended for the general public. I had reliable contacts among both the scientific-technical community and the military.

Therefore, I tried to learn more details of Vladimir Ivanovich's biography, which was very difficult in 1990. It was not without small gifts to personnel staff. But these expenses were well worth it, because understanding a person's biography helps understand his decisions and his role in great matters.

After the war, in 1950, Markov graduated from the Zhukovsky Military Aviation Academy and began working in the famous Design Bureau-1 (KB-1) under the direction of future academician Alexander Andreyevich Raspletin. From 1963 to 1968, he held the responsible position of deputy chief designer at the Scientific Production Association 'Vector' (NPO 'Vector'), where he participated in the development of air defense system components.

The conversation with the former deputy minister of radio industry of the USSR, head of the Scientific Research Center 'Vympel' (TSNPO 'Vympel'), director of the Scientific Research Institute for Distant Air Detection (NIIDAD), retired General-Lieutenant, and Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Ivanovich Markov took place at his apartment.

—Vladimir Ivanovich, you held high positions in the military-industrial complex of the USSR, and were personally responsible for the production of many samples of radioelectronic armament. What place did over-the-horizon radar occupy in your work?

—I was one of the initiators of all work on the creation of a combat over-the-horizon radar system.

—But then you probably directly participated in the selection of deployment locations for over-the-horizon radars?

—I did that as well. I wanted to place the first radar on Kamchatka. We flew there with a group of specialists and selected a site. But the radar required a lot of electrical energy, and on the peninsula there was insufficient power generation capacity.

—As some specialists claim, the Chernobyl variant of OTRH placement turned out to be a mistake. Surely it was possible to avoid this fatal error?

—It's easy to talk like that now. But at that period, the international situation was very complex. As a result, when creating some types of weaponry, we consciously took risks in order to give them to the troops more quickly.

—Could the combat OTRH system, which the state commission headed by Colonel General Votintsev did not accept into service, have been further refined? Was such a decision correct?

—Certainly, the tactical-technical characteristics of the combat over-the-horizon system could have been improved. The necessity of conducting this work was indicated in a special decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, and such work was actually being conducted at the institute.

And the state commission for the acceptance into service of the combat OTRH system, headed by the commander of Air Defense and Missile Defense Forces, Colonel General Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev, whose subordinates were supposed to subsequently operate the system, expressed critical remarks. They did not believe that the system would be effective.

—Individual specialists from NIIDAD, former chief designer Franz Kuzminskiy, claim that you, with your proposals, hindered the refinement of OTRH. What problems became a stumbling block?

—Initially, I supported all of Franz Alexandrovich's technical solutions for the technical refinement of the combat OTRH system. After all, they were adopted not personally by the chief designer, but by a scientific-technical council comprised of leading scientists and specialists.

However, my work did not go well at the Ministry of Radio Industry, and I asked to return to NIIDAD. For some time at the post of institute director, I not only monitored the work of Franz Kuzminskiy, but analyzed the proposals and conclusions of the state commission, which raised many questions about the correctness of his decisions.

I believe that Kuzminskiy devoted too much attention to the refinement of OTRH at Chernobyl. However, in doing so, he became captive to his own conclusions and did not accept the criticism of the state commission regarding the system's ineffectiveness for the purposes intended.

In place of Kuzminskiy, I proposed the designer, Colonel Yevstratov. Incidentally, Fyodor Fyodorovich worked under Kuzminskiy's direction and was his protégé. But as soon as Yevstratov began to speak about the necessity of fundamental changes in the system, Kuzminskiy's supporters began to oppose him.

—But then, why did the new chief designer of OTRH, Fyodor Yevstratov, fail to refine the combat OTRH system?

—He surely could have. He was a qualified specialist for such work. But the Chernobyl disaster got in the way. A radioactive cloud covered the Chernihiv radar, and it was mothballed. Only one radar at Komsomolsk-on-Amur remained on operational readiness.

For its part, the command of the Air Defense Forces of the country proposed introducing into the new budget additional funds for the replacement of engineering systems. As a result, additional expenses increased to several million rubles.

—Were you aware that the dismissed former chief designer Kuzminskiy, together with some like-minded individuals, scientifically substantiated the solutions for radar refinement?

—I know that Franz Kuzminskiy, together with scientists from Moscow State University, worked on the problem of improving the combat OTRH system. However, he and his associates did not really confirm this and even refused further contacts with me on this issue.

All the same, a special commission of the Military-Industrial Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers examined the proposals of the former chief designer of OTRH, Franz Kuzminskiy. To avoid allegations of bias, they invited independent experts. But they confirmed that the system did not meet the requirements.

—And do you consider the removal of the OTRH from operational readiness duty near Komsomolsk-on-Amur justified?

—Let me note again that 'Duga'

is a means for long-range detection and tracking of aircraft, for vectoring interceptors onto them. The OTRH is very effective against aerodynamic targets at ranges of 3,000 kilometers or more, if the conditions for the propagation of radio waves are favorable.

In his conversation, Markov did not hide that he had disagreements with Franz Kuzminskiy. Moreover, he even claimed that Kuzminskiy himself trapped himself in the corner of problems regarding relations with the NIIDAD director. Moreover, Markov considered that Kuzminskiy could not objectively evaluate his own decisions.

That same day, after the conversation with Markov, I called Colonel General Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev at his apartment and asked the military commander to suggest to me who else among the senior leadership of the Armed Forces I could consult for competent information about the over-the-horizon radar problem.

—Mikhail Ivanovich in the 4th Main Directorate [of the General Staff] was responsible for the creation of OTRH,— answered the colonel general to my question, —and if OTRH after acceptance into service turned out to be ineffective, then one of the first to suffer would be Nenashev. He was the one who defended the adoption of the system.

Perhaps the colonel general did not say everything about the possible consequences for Nenashev in the event that OTRH after acceptance into service turned out to be, mildly speaking, worthless. It was he who gave the defense minister the assurance that the system would be effective for the country's defense.