Chapter 13: Archive of the Chief Designer

Original: Глава 13 «Архив главного конструктора»

On my desk before me lies an ordinary student's notebook with grid lines for mathematics lessons from the Soviet era of our country's history, priced at twelve full-weight Soviet kopecks. The green cover has faded with time and become a grayish-green color. Next to the notebook lies a rather thick manuscript—a draft letter on standard sheets addressed to the leadership of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Ministry of Radio Industry of the USSR, the commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and the head of Central Design Bureau "Vympel". The next manuscript is a draft comprising 54 standard sheets with no title. It is evident that this is the beginning of a substantial literary work that Chief Designer Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky had conceived. One can see that the draft text came to Franz Alexandrovich through serious creative struggles and deliberation. The manuscript is full of corrections, crossed-out passages, deletions, and marginal additions, making it quite difficult to read.

The materials in the grid-lined student notebook and the draft letter to the leaders served as the basis for official letters that Franz Alexandrovich sent to various agencies and departments shortly before his death, in which he demonstrated how the improvement of combat over-the-horizon radar systems should be carried out. Those letters from the scientist simply vanished without a trace. At least, all my appeals to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Radio Industry, and the Military-Industrial Commission proved futile. I received standard brush-offs stating that such-and-such a document had not been received and was not registered. Then a perfectly legitimate question arises: where did they disappear to, or did someone deliberately place them in personal safes or under the bureaucrats' desks? However, unexpectedly, drafts of papers from the late Kuzminsky appeared. And this is not a forgery, but working documents written in the chief designer's own hand, on the basis of which official letters were already being composed. The important thing is that Franz Alexandrovich, clearly sensing that he was fundamentally being denied the opportunity to complete the combat over-the-horizon system, decided on open battle with the obvious and hidden opponents of the ОГРЛС. Someone at that time in the USSR, or certain forces, found it very advantageous to bury his years of work and, along with it, possibly the famous Radio Engineering Research Institute. My own appearances as a military journalist in various media outlets only partially revealed the ОГРЛС problem and its tragedy. The chief designer was never allowed to publish any material in any publication during his lifetime. So we ended up with rather one-sided and incomplete information about one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet military-industrial complex. And then a taboo was placed on the ОГРЛС problem in Russian media altogether. I know this firsthand. In my desk drawer lies a dozen or more materials I have prepared for various central newspapers and magazines. My materials on the ОГРЛС, already typeset and prepared for publication, were removed at the last moment from journal issues and replaced with other articles. Often this was explained by the absence of proof that Kuzminsky actually proposed realistic paths for improving his super-radars. I could not argue against such reasoning. And now I have Kuzminsky's rough notes. In my view, they eloquently demonstrate the atmosphere in which this talented scientist worked in his final years, that he was indeed close to unlocking the secrets of the ionosphere and achieved quite significant results in this endeavor. Moreover, the manuscripts very clearly show the relationships within НИИДАР itself regarding one of the thematic directions—over-the-horizon detection. After leaving НИИДАР, Franz Alexandrovich began working practically alone on the over-the-horizon problem. He had the courage of a scientist, the knowledge, and already accumulated enormous scientific-experimental material. The scientist decided not to raise the white flag before his opponents, not to change the main theme of his research. Within just a couple of years, Franz Alexandrovich clearly formulated how the already-constructed combat system, on which the state had spent, in total at that time, over a billion full-weight Soviet rubles, needed to be improved.

But unfortunately, the era of solitary geniuses had long since passed. For decades, enormous collectives of scientists and designers had been struggling with the over-the-horizon problem and the mysteries of the ionosphere. It seemed that just one more effort, one more experiment, and the secret of the ionosphere would be revealed, and mighty shortwave radars would appear that could locate air and space objects around the entire Earth. But each time Mother Nature presented new mysteries. These were reported in earlier chapters. Some people began openly linking these failures with the name of Franz Kuzminsky. After many years of the most difficult searches, Franz Alexandrovich was forced to leave НИИДАР. In the multi-thousand-strong scientific collective, this was perceived in different ways. There were certainly malcontents. They said that now, with our potential, we'll finish the combat over-the-horizon system ourselves. It didn't work out. In the collective, Kuzminsky was remembered as a former director who had failed to perfect his system. But then Franz Alexandrovich suddenly sprang a surprise. And what a surprise it was. A couple of years later, he began knocking on doors and calling all interested agencies with his proposals on how to make the ОГРЛС all-seeing. There was quite an uproar. One high-ranking retired general frankly told me how the proposals of Franz Alexandrovich were discussed in his agency. No one took it upon himself to say that the proposals of the retired scientist should be accepted, that he should be reinstated in his position, and that those officials who had forced Kuzminsky to leave НИИДАР should be censured. Yet everyone was tormented by doubt: what if Kuzminsky was wrong in his conclusions? And they feared the possible consequences that might follow from Kuzminsky's return. After all, a considerable coterie of officials at all levels bore responsibility for his departure. A terrible scandal might have erupted, one that the Party Commission under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would surely have investigated. Many would have lost their posts and Party cards, which at that time was equivalent to 'civil execution,' as it had been in tsarist times. It is quite possible that precisely because of the successes of the lone wolf Kuzminsky, his letters to me, a research associate at a central military journal, were not even shown to anyone in the Military-Industrial Commission, nor in the Ministry of Radio Industry, nor in the Air Defense Forces headquarters. And at Central Design Bureau "Vympel" they simply invoked the notorious secrecy of the work and refused to speak with me. Now the originals, at best, are gathering dust somewhere on archive shelves.

But come now, ladies and gentlemen. What secrecy surrounds the ОГРЛС? Tens, or perhaps hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens knew about them. The fact is that one clan of high-ranking Soviet scientists and bureaucrats decided to completely suppress the matter of Franz Kuzminsky and his combat system. This system, so vital for the military capability of the state, had become quite unfashionable during the flowering of democratic transformations in the USSR and the universal love affair with the United States in our Union. So the elderly, brilliant scientist and organizer walked from one office to another without any hope. And the bureaucrats surely called immediately and reported to those who needed to know about Kuzminsky's visits. It is possible that dispatches about this even reached Washington. And there they openly rejoiced that in the USSR the Soviets themselves, with their own hands, were destroying a talented scientist who, back in the 1970s, with his mighty over-the-horizon radars, had irradiated American missile bases and struck fear and amazement in the American political and military elite. In the USA, they greatly feared these Soviet radars and quietly built their own, of much lesser power. Only they could not compete across the ocean with Franz Kuzminsky and other brilliant radio-engineers from НИИДАР. And in general, for Americans, this НИИДАР had long been like a bone in their throat. A relatively small collective of Soviet scientists, working on a rather outdated experimental-production base, was literally performing miracles in radar engineering.

Now one would like to frankly tell who benefited from, and for what purposes, pushing Kuzminsky out of the institute and preventing him from completing the system of mighty over-the-horizon stations. After all, many knew that Kuzminsky and his team were on the threshold of the greatest scientific discovery of the twentieth century—over-the-horizon shortwave radar detection at ultra-long distances. I am not a militarist, although I hold the rank of colonel in the Russian Army Reserve, but as an ordinary journalist and Russian citizen, I do not want any repetition of sudden and devastating blows against our Motherland. But for that, Russia itself, entering this twenty-first century, must know how to defend itself. This is not a platitude—it is reality.

In the mid-1990s, there was a certain imposing journalist with a stubbled black face who, having no military education whatsoever, arbitrarily assumed for himself some rank or title—military journalist. All democratic media outlets, including foreign ones, loved to show and publish his pacifist revelations. And after some time it turned out that this bearded and well-fed gentleman was operating on an impressive grant from a certain English charitable organization. Such gentlemen, having received foreign grants, tried to sully in various Soviet and Russian publications the work of Franz Kuzminsky. I will not name this bearded journalist so as not to give him publicity. To hell with him and his slanderous outbursts of past years against our army. Few remember that now. I brought up this example to show once again that during the time I worked on the over-the-horizon radar topic, I learned a lot that ordinary Russians do not even suspect.

For my part, I in no way present myself as a defender of Franz Kuzminsky. I simply conducted a multi-year journalistic investigation. I gathered facts and examples. I published information about the over-the-horizon epic in a number of publications. This information has reached and continues to reach Russians. Recently I received via email a very interesting document about the gigantic scientific-technical work that Franz Kuzminsky and his like-minded colleagues conducted. It's a shame that the author of this document forgot to sign his name for some reason. There are apparently reasons for that. Upon first reading, immediately before me appeared the image not of a grandstanding orator Kuzminsky, but of a man of action and considerable intellect. It is evident that this scientist or engineer who sent the document by email directly participated in many experiments conducted under the direction of Franz Kuzminsky. Therefore, he described with such meticulous care and conciseness, on just a few pages, the part of the gigantic work to create the combat ОГРЛС system that he knew and the study of the secrets and mysteries of the ionosphere. In practically all areas of human knowledge and science, researchers can at least observe the fruits of their experiments, even touch with their hands space vehicles that have returned to Earth. Over-the-horizon experiments, however, were conducted at altitudes exceeding 100 kilometers and at ranges up to 10,000 kilometers. No matter how sophisticated mathematical models or computers, they could not accurately assess how a radar signal propagates at such distances and altitudes, what happens to it, how it is affected by the ionosphere, solar activity, and cosmic rays. This was truly a cosmic mystery. And the scientific work on this problem is remarkable for its boldness, for humanity's capacity to solve truly fantastic tasks. Without excessive pathos or bias, I note that the work on over-the-horizon radar fully demonstrated the genius of Franz Kuzminsky and many of his colleagues, about whom I spoke earlier. For greater understanding of what they were doing, I think it is worth presenting in full this email.

The scientist called it "RESEARCH PROGRAM AND WORK PARTICIPANTS." (I remind you that here we are discussing only a part of the experiments conducted before and during the construction of the combat ОГРЛС system).

"In the early 1970s, Chief Designer F.A. Kuzminsky, within the framework of Development Projects 5Н77М and 5Н32, conceived and sequentially implemented an extensive program of experimental-research work on the main directions of over-the-horizon problems, including:

— research into ultra-long-distance ionospheric propagation of shortwave radio waves based on studying seasonal-daily, azimuthal, and frequency-energy characteristics of circumnavigating signals;

— research into methods of adapting the ОГРЛС to changing geophysical conditions based on studying the radiophysical properties of reciprocal-incline propagation signals;

— research into far-field signal propagation along oblique sounding paths 'land-to-land' (10,000 km), as well as 'land-to-air,' using reflected signals in the shortwave range;

— research into the characteristics of effective reflecting surfaces and signals reflected from ballistic missile trails in the shortwave band at ranges up to 3,000 kilometers;

— research into the spatial-altitude structure of radio fields created by the ОГРЛС at ranges up to 7,000 km;

— research into the effect of powerful ОГРЛС radiation on the characteristics of far-field ionospheric propagation;

— research into the possibilities of improving the probability characteristics of ОГРЛС detection using spatially-separated reception of reflected signals with optimal signal processing;

— assessment of the effect of the polar ionosphere on the operation of the ОГРЛС."

To solve these tasks, a complex of remote facilities was created throughout the territory of the Soviet Union, united into a single system with the ОГРЛС 5Н77 (city of Nikolaev). The complex included:

— automatic ionospheric stations for monitoring the state of the ionosphere in various zones of the detection paths of 5Н77, deployed in the regions of cities Tomsk, Chita, Baku, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, as well as at the main observation post in Nikolaev;

— deployed radar signal simulators 5Г93 and effective reflecting surface measuring instruments for assessing potential detection capabilities, deployed in the regions of Priozersk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and other locations;

— altitude field measuring instruments installed aboard geophysical rockets 217МАП—measuring the altitude distribution of the received signal in the far zone in the regions of Semipalatinsk, Kapustin Yar, and other locations;

— circumnavigating signal measuring instruments (ИКС)—measuring characteristics of circumnavigating signals in the regions of cities Tomsk, Chita, Baku, Talsi (Baltic region);

— a deployed receiving position deployed in the region of city Stryy (Lviv Oblast)."

"The development and creation of remote facilities were carried out by teams from НИИДАР under the direction of N.A. Moiseev, V.P. Chepiga, A.V. Kashintsev, and I.V. Polikarpovich.

The development, installation of the remote facilities complex equipment, and the conducting of measurements at deployment sites were carried out by:

automatic ionospheric stations and circumnavigating signal measuring instruments—G.A. Chudin, V.F. Zheleznyakov, V.G. Bogdanov, A.S. Semenov, V.B. Holodenko, N.P. Burbela, and others;

simulators 5Г93 and IRP—V.V. Zimin, N.V. Zhemerev, I.M. Zamorin;

Antonov AN-12 aircraft—V.V. Volkov, B.S. Rubtsov, N.A. Tarasov, G.N. Tarev, N.P. Burtsev, E.F. Sharanov;

altitude field measuring instruments 1, 2, 3—A.A. Kalinin, Y.M. Vlasov, V.V. Kozak, V.V. Volkov, N.P. Burtsev, A.S. Konovalov, V.G. Luzanovsky, E.M. Eliseyev, and others;

methodological guidance of work, analysis and processing of measurement data at facility 3065Н (city of Nikolaev) were carried out by teams from НИИДАР and the Nikolaev branch of НИИДАР—N.N. Gavrilov, V.I. Reutov, N.A. Kozhakin, A.V. Akhramenko, A.G. Chernov, V.A. Ivanov, and others;

ionosphere modeling and development of principles for optimizing frequency-angle modes of the radar were carried out by V.F. Akimov, Y.K. Kalinin, A.D. Ruchkin, A.B. Ostroumov, and others;

V.A. Alebarov, V.P. Rzhanitsyn, T.V. Ivanchenko, V.I. Kubov, N.T. Saynyuk, S. Fenik, V. Zagrebelniy—conducted processing and analysis of measurement results for frequency-angle optimization;

S.M. Savelev, V.A. Chobayan, V.N. Ivanov, A.S. Terekh ov, N.I. Tkachenko, V.V. Popok—analysis of measurement results from automatic ionospheric stations, investigation of seasonal-daily variations in ionospheric parameters and their influence on signal propagation characteristics;

V.S. Kristal, M.M. Panfilov, L.N. Lvov jointly with officers from military unit 02427 (V.A. Dabagyan, V.N. Lenin, L.G. Levin, L.M. Bykovsky, Y.V. Volkov) conducted research into the characteristics of effective reflecting surfaces and signal processing;

Development, debugging, and improvement of trajectory processing algorithms were carried out by G.A. Lidlein, D.D. Sadov, N.P. Sadova, and others;

All work involved representatives from military unit 03425 (45th Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense)—V.N. Vasenev, A. Kazantsev, S.I. Kozlov, Bikineev, V.G. Legasov, and others."

"Management of the remote facilities complex from facility 3065Н was carried out by the department of remote facilities of military unit 02427 under the direction of F.M. Serdyukov; V. Markov and others actively participated;

The technical director of the receiving position was O.M. Ilyukhin; responsibility for organizing communications and data transmission fell to V.D. Rogachev;

Technical support for the research conducted at facility 3065Н (city of Nikolaev) was carried out under the direction of V.N. Strelkin and A.N. Shtrakhov (later N.V. Ryabykh);

In 1981–1984, a complex of work was conducted on detecting rocket launches using a deployed receiving position deployed in the region of city Stryy (Lviv Oblast). The development and implementation were entrusted to a brigade under the direction of G.A. Chudin;

The apparatus of the deployed receiving position (ВПП) was developed on the basis of the receiving part of product 28Ж6, but with substantial refinements for the modes of the РАС 5Н77 system. The receiving apparatus consisted of fifteen receiver channels, each of which could independently process signals. In the receiving apparatus, special devices were installed for measuring signal parameters and recording measurement results on magnetic tape. The recording equipment operated at a speed of 6.25 inches per second, providing a frequency response from 0 to 40 kHz;"

In the creation of the facility participated V.N. Strelkin, G.A. Chudin (technical director of the facility), V.P. Rzhanitsyn (scientific director of the research), K.G. Bazay, V.I. Romanov, V.P. Chepiga, V.V. Kuznetsov, and others;

The receiving apparatus of the ВПП was developed in Department 8 of НИИДАР: V.P. Gaitsev, A.Y. Andrievsky, V.V. Pankin;

The antenna-feeder device in Department 6: project director N.S. Shvedov;

The computational complex in Department 9: V.S. Chernyaev, E.N. Belyaev, and others;

Algorithms and programs: A.B. Vinokurov, S.A. Zarudnyak;

Methodological direction of work at the facility was provided by representatives of НИИДАР and the Nikolaev branch of НИИДАР—S.M. Savelev, A.I. Slashinim, P.M. Chudakov, R.Z. Agzamov, V.N. Sushkov, and others;

Technical maintenance of the ВПП was carried out by representatives of the installation organization YUTPP under the direction of V.G. Mirontcev, M.M. Odzhubesky."

On four standard pages, very briefly shown is only a part of that enormous scientific-research work on studying the properties of the ionosphere and determining how to overcome the many obstacles that nature put in the path of scientists. As we can see from the program, the chief designer Kuzminsky and his colleagues conducted a whole series of experiments, developed methods and algorithms, assembled many devices and instruments, used aircraft, rockets, and ships. The scale of the work was indeed enormous. At every stage—from the conception of the system through to its implementation—they had to invent, create, and overcome tremendous difficulties. Each experiment required tens of thousands of man-hours. And all this was done to improve one complex system, which had cost the state more than a billion rubles. Without exaggeration, one can say that Kuzminsky and his colleagues created new chapters in applied radiophysics, electromagnetism, and radio-location.

And now part of the archive of scientist and designer Franz Kuzminsky will become available to all. Surely some people will not like this very much. After all, those who had a hand in forcing out Kuzminsky—those who invented various intrigues against him—will now have to face truthful information laid out in black and white. Let them try to explain their intrigues and claims that 'we ourselves will finish the system.' What came of that? Absolutely nothing. And Kuzminsky, working almost alone in retirement, in the most difficult conditions, proposed real ways to improve his system. The following materials are largely based on the notes and letters of the chief designer. I decided to publish these materials exactly as Franz Alexandrovich wrote them, without any significant correction of his text, so that readers would understand how a great scientist thought, what troubled him, what he dreamed about, and what circumstances compelled him to take up the pen.

As an author, in processing Kuzminsky's materials, I tried not to change anything in them without good reason. After all, how could I make corrections or shorten the scientist's notes and conclusions if this could unintentionally change the essence of what was presented, his technical proposals? No, I have kept the materials of Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky in their original form, making only minor editorial corrections that do not affect the meaning of the text.

It is worth beginning an examination of the materials of the chief designer preserved in my personal archive with the notes in an old school notebook. These are the revelations of a scientist, written in early 1983, about the relationships that had developed in НИИДАР between its leadership and concerning the combat over-the-horizon radar system.

"The Green Notebook"

"Based on the Decree (Editor's Note: This refers to the joint decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of the combat ОГРЛС system), two radar nodes 'Arc' have been created, designed for over-the-horizon detection of ballistic missiles launched from the continental United States.

The complexity and fundamental novelty of the radiophysical factors underlying over-the-horizon rocket launch detection (ionosphere, plasma from rocket engine plumes, active and passive interference) limited the task solved for combat application to the detection of rocket launches under conditions of mass launches. However, for the final stage, measures have been provided for detecting single rocket launches with characteristics acceptable for combat application.

At the same time, there is a possibility to ensure the detection of launches of single (small groups) rockets with characteristics acceptable for combat application. The possibility of over-the-horizon detection by the 'Arc' radar nodes of launches of single rockets at ranges of 8–9 thousand kilometers has been proven by practical experiments conducted under the direction of Chief Designer F.A. Kuzminsky. This possibility, taking into account the effectiveness of the measures provided by the Decree, makes it possible to consider the basic requirements established for the combat system as achievable.

When preparing the draft Decree, it was deemed expedient to carry out the improvement of node No. 1 on the basis of already existing technical solutions for suppressing only passive interference. By the same Decree, the Ministry of Defense was instructed to determine in 1984, jointly with the Ministry of Radio Industry, the procedure for conducting a complex of research and design work on the improvement of node No. 2 of the 'Arc' system to detect single rocket launches with specified characteristics. This complex of work has been provisionally designated 'Arc-2M.'

Over the past eighteen months, a number of organizational and technical measures have been conducted in НИИДАР, which have weakened the front of work on further improvement of the 'Arc' radar nodes. These measures can be considered as consisting of two main groups.

In the first group, measures predominate that are directed toward limiting the work on improving the 'Arc' radar nodes to the scope of the immediate tasks established by the Decree with respect to radar node No. 1.

In the second group, measures predominate that create an atmosphere of ill-will, internal anxiety among the main work executors, persecution of the chief designer, and undermining of his authority as the director of the work.

Some measures of the first group

An important scientific-technical direction for further increasing electromagnetic hardness is the application and experimental testing of the method of multi-channel reception with spatial filtering of received signals. The solution of this task is provided by the approved tactical-technical specification for the research and development work "Arc-2M." However, the measures taken have limited the scope of the work to the resolution of only the immediate tasks. The decision to conduct the primary experimental research work "Arc-2M" on a broader scale has been hindered.

In November 1982, the Scientific and Technical Council of the enterprise adopted a recommendation to determine the scope and timing of the work on primary experimental research "Arc-2M" after approval of the specification and review of the project. As a result, time was lost, no agreed decision on the specification for the primary experimental research "Arc-2M" has been reached. The calculation has not been approved, financing is absent, and the overall schedule for the improvement of the 'Arc' system has been disrupted.

A characteristic feature of the organizational measures being conducted is the ambiguity of the intended final goal.

Example. In the fall of 1981, the director proclaims the leading role of the Nikolaev branch of НИИДАР in the improvement of the 'Arc' node No. 1. The motives put forward seem logical and progressive. In reality, there is a different logic, which manifested itself in subsequent actions. Namely, if the branch is to play the leading role, then naturally a new chief designer should be appointed from its staff, and the branch itself should become the head contractor.

Following this logic, indeed in the subsequent period attempts are made to appoint a new chief designer from the employees of the branch, and it is stipulated in the order of the Central Design Bureau (No. 132 of July 3, 1982) to designate the Nikolaev branch as the head contractor for the bulk of the work assigned by the Decree and related to the improvement of node No. 1. Simultaneously, it is stipulated to move a portion of the scientific work from the main enterprise (НИИДАР) to the branch, and to coordinate the work of the main enterprise with the branch leadership. In the proposed variant, the scientific leadership of the overall work remains formally with the chief designer but actually passes to the leadership of the Nikolaev branch.

The transfer to the branch of all the aforementioned tasks means a serious expansion of its profile in the direction of a hardware-development organization. Under real conditions, when the branch lacks a laboratory-sectoral base, lacks specialists in the appropriate fields, and there is no growth base in the city, there is no representative of the machine-building industry on which to rely—this creates a situation where such a transfer means, in essence, a transfer of the responsibility for the main work to a branch that is not prepared for it. In this situation, the main enterprise would assume the role of co-executors or consultants, which would naturally lead to a loss of unified leadership of the overall work.

By the Decree of May 31, 1982, it is provided for the manufacture, installation, and adjustment of the equipment (newly introduced), necessary for the improvement of the 'Arc' node No. 1. The manufacturer of the equipment is the pilot plant of НИИДАР. Technical documentation for the borrowed equipment exists and the Customer has agreed to use it. However, the scheduling of the comprehensive improvement plan for node 'Arc' No. 1, which includes the manufacture of equipment, has been held up.

A comprehensive schedule for the improvement of the 'Arc' node No. 1, which provides for the manufacture of equipment, has been developed, however its approval in НИИДАР (and consequently its approval by management) has been delayed pending the completion of the review of the draft project. Although this might be viewed as justified, the delay is creating complications for the pilot plant in planning its work.

Some measures of the second group

Persecution of the chief designer began on the first day of the new director's arrival at НИИДАР with the question: "Why did the Minister release you from the position of director of НИИДАР with the announcement of gratitude in the order?" Subsequently, for almost half a year, the chief designer had no structurally subordinate subdivisions, which greatly weakened his ability to conduct work. This was followed by hints that, perhaps, it would be better for the chief designer to retire. Naturally, such a situation created serious psychological pressure and distracted attention from the main work.

A situation developed in which it was difficult to count on a positive response from the director even on matters of serious business significance. Example. The most important task at present is to clarify the effect of the polar ionosphere on the characteristics of node 'Arc' No. 1. This work is being conducted directly at the observation post in Nikolaev and requires the participation of representatives of НИИДАР. However, to send a representative to Nikolaev, approval from the director is required, but approval is consistently delayed for various pretexts.

The systematic expression of dissatisfaction, reproaches, and threats became the norm in the director's attitude toward the chief designer. This was expressed both orally (such as "get out of the way, or there will be trouble") and in writing (such as "I call attention to lack of discipline, avoidance of personal participation...") All of this created a tense psychological situation.

I have repeatedly attempted to take measures such as personal contact with Director V.I. Markov of НИИДАР in order to establish normal working relations. However, no clear result has yet been achieved. I cannot explain the underlying cause of what is happening. However, whatever it may be, its consequences are undesirable and not conducive to productive work. In the context of all this, I felt obliged to address a memorandum to leadership.

I request assistance in creating normal working conditions for the completion of the assigned task."

My Questions

1. Why was there an attempt to remove the chief designer in July 1982 and to lobby for Comrade Alebarov in his place—the de facto scientific director of the Nikolaev branch?

2. Why did the director not sign the specification for the improvement of the 'Arc,' justifying this by the presence of the task to evaluate the radar cross-section of single rockets—when this is precisely the cornerstone of the further improvement of the 'Arc'?

3. Why did the director not sign the comprehensive protocol for evaluating the effectiveness of technical solutions underlying the draft project, when this protocol was developed and unanimously signed by a commission with the participation of the Customer?

4. Why, on the eve of the final stage of signing the draft project, did he throw Comrade Alebarov into moral and psychological turmoil for several weeks, using for this purpose his misinterpretation of the comprehensive protocol for evaluating technical solutions being incorporated into the improvement of the radar node, which was approved by the commission with the participation of the Customer?

5. Why did he not award the collective a bonus for more than two years of work on the introduction, testing, and evaluation of the effectiveness of technical solutions for the improvement of the radar node, when these solutions were positively evaluated by a commission with the participation of the Customer with the preparation of the appropriate comprehensive protocol (approved at the Scientific and Technical Council)?

6. Why did he obstruct my direct participation, as chief designer, in writing the draft project at the final stage of its development: first he allowed a trip to Nikolaev only for 4 (!!!) days, then after losing more than a week, he allowed (with insults) for 40 days. However, after two weeks he suddenly recalled me to Moscow with a demand to write the main parts of the draft project remotely, without being present.

7. Why, precisely in mid-November—the most tense moment of the final stage of writing the draft project—did the director issue an order, not agreed upon with the chief designer, on the appointment of deputies to the chief designer, in which he cancels the rationally established functions of the deputies of the chief designer and creates new ones, which are clearly not thought through?

8. Why does he obstruct the participation of Deputies Kukis and Markeshnin in the development of the draft project at the final, most critical stage of its development—after repeated insistent demands, he allowed them to arrive in Nikolaev for just one week and refused to extend the duration despite the extremely tight schedule of work?

9. Why, under the pretext of 'accelerating' the process of presenting the draft project to the Customer, did he not conduct the appropriate review by the Scientific and Technical Council of НИИДАР, as a result of which from the moment of readiness of the draft project to the moment of its presentation to the Customer, more than 1.5 months passed (unprecedented!)?

10. Why did he refuse to conclude a contract with the Customer for the manufacture of borrowed equipment when the Customer agreed to it?

11. Why was the pilot plant not given a plan for 1983 for the manufacture of equipment for the improvement of the radar node?

12. Why did he not sign the calculation for 32Д6 for 4 months?

13. Why does he not sign the decisions, agreed upon by all parties, on the creation of an interdepartmental commission for advance review of the progress of work on the polar ionosphere?

14. Why does he obstruct the implementation of the second stage of 'Arc-2M'?

What can one say? A very interesting draft indeed. I would even characterize it as a cry from the heart of the chief designer, to whom the director and the forces behind him were openly putting obstacles in the way, preventing him from perfecting the already created most complex radar weapon, which at that time no other state in the world possessed. It is clear from these notes that Kuzminsky felt the injustice of the situation and the ill will of his colleague, but also that he retained the faith that by persistent work and the submission of well-reasoned proposals, he could still overcome these obstacles.

The next draft is of an official letter from the former chief designer Franz Kuzminsky to the Chairman of the Commission on Military-Industrial Questions under the Council of Ministers of the USSR Maslyukov, Minister of Radio Industry of the USSR Pleshakov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces Koldunov, and Deputy Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of Radio Industry, concerning proposals for improving the ОГРЛС.

"It is known that the ОГРЛС was put on alert with an unexplained reason for the low effectiveness in detecting rocket launches from the territory of the USA. Considering myself obligated for this, I continued, after leaving НИИДАР, an independent search for the causes and methods of overcoming this problem. At present, this work has been completed to a significant degree. I am sending you my findings and proposals regarding the elimination of the reason for the low detection characteristics and the ways to improve the ОГРЛС based on these findings.

It would be an error to assume that only exceptionally large attenuation of radio waves in the ionosphere and unfavorable reflecting properties of the target are the source of the low detection characteristics of the ОГРЛС. Such a position incorrectly orients the search for methods of improvement. More dangerous is diffuse multipath propagation, which leads to the destruction of the informative content of the radar signal. This source of low detection characteristics has been underestimated or overlooked in the design of the ОГРЛС and by its subsequent operation.

Over-the-horizon radar knows how to fight attenuation of radio waves in the ionosphere, but it is powerless against the destruction of the informative content of the radar signal caused by diffuse multipath propagation. This is its main shortcoming, which has led to low detection characteristics, and the essence of our design proposals for improvement concerns precisely this shortcoming.

The method for eliminating this shortcoming consists of applying regularizing algorithms for processing received signals. They make it possible to restore the informative content of the radar signal, destroyed by diffuse multipath propagation. Based on the results of completed research, including modeling on computers and experimental verification, we can affirm that the application of regularizing algorithms will increase the probability of detecting rockets by 1.5–2 times.

It should be emphasized that the 'simple' transfer to over-the-horizon radar of detection methods adopted in above-the-horizon radar, without proper consideration of the dispersive properties of the ionosphere, proved unjustified. It became the source of non-conformity of the ОГРЛС with the requirements placed upon them.

In the presence of diffuse multipath propagation, the target is irradiated by a multitude of signals 'continuously' following one after another over a limited interval of the ionospheric delay time. At a certain delay value within this interval, there is a violation of the initial phasing (coherence) of the spectral components of the propagating signal. As a result, the signal components in the receiver are summed incoherently. The spectrum of the received signal becomes wider than the coherence bandwidth of the ionosphere, and the signal itself becomes 'noisy,' becoming masked by its own noise.

Thus, the signal reflected from the target, whose spectrum is wider than the coherence bandwidth of the ionosphere, itself carries a self-masking interference that reduces the probability of detecting the target to zero. This interference can be eliminated by narrowing the spectrum of the transmitted signals to minimal values. But in this case the ОГРЛС would be deprived of one of its important advantages—multi-target detection capability. Therefore, the only correct way out is the application of regularizing algorithms for signal processing.

The use of regularizing algorithms as a means of achieving the maximum possible detection characteristics of the ОГРЛС requires reference information about the properties of the Doppler spectrum of the target and about the properties of the sources that distort both this spectrum and the radar delay of the received signals. Research on this issue has been completed to a significant degree. It is my conviction that the information obtained will make it possible to develop signal processing algorithms that will substantially increase the detection probability of the ОГРЛС."

The main content of the necessary improvement of the ОГРЛС consists of the following:

— Introduction of an algorithm for operational evaluation of the coherence bandwidth of the ionosphere and selection of the optimal spectrum of transmitted signals. Input signal information for this can be obtained from signals reflected from Earth, with appropriate consideration of the extent of reflection. The algorithm for choosing the spectrum for frequencies of about 8–12 MHz has already been worked out and tested on experimental data;

— Introduction of corrections to the algorithm for selecting frequencies that minimize attenuation (the ОЧУР algorithm), in order to select frequencies that take into account both attenuation and the coherence bandwidth of the ionosphere;

— Implementation of a regularizing algorithm for restoring a two-dimensional (delay, frequency) ambiguity function;

— Introduction of corrections to the software-algorithmic complex, resulting from the implementation of the aforementioned algorithms."

Obviously, before improving the combat versions of the ОГРЛС, it is necessary to test the appropriate design solutions on the experimental version in Nikolaev and refine the quantitative evaluation of their effectiveness with the aid of rocket launches from the far zone.

I reached the conclusion about the inevitable necessity of introducing measures into the ОГРЛС to ensure minimization of the negative effect of diffuse multipath propagation in 1984. I reported on this at that time to the interested comrades. The conclusion of the commission created for this purpose confirmed my findings, but for the time being no concrete measures have been taken. I should also note that the experimental data obtained at the Nikolaev facility and the computer modeling results constitute sufficient evidence for the necessity and feasibility of the proposed measures for improving the ОГРЛС. This information is in my possession and I can present it at any time to interested organizations.

I also became familiar with the appendix. It contains two sections:

1. The decomposition of the radar signal in the ionosphere into coherent and incoherent components.

2. The regularizing algorithm.

All conclusions are supported by mathematical formulas. It is quite obvious that Kuzminsky analytically worked through a very complex scientific problem of improving the combat ОГРЛС system to make it all-seeing. I think that any specialist in radar engineering and radiophysics would be impressed by the depth and substance of Kuzminsky's proposals. His recommendations are not of an abstract theoretical character, but are based on concrete experimental data obtained in Nikolaev and also on the results of computer modeling.

The third part of Franz Kuzminsky's draft archive notes is of a literary character. They narrate about human relationships during the period when the decision was being made to create the combat ОГРЛС system. And somehow, imperceptibly, the narrative passes into the author's own personal memories and reflections about those historic moments in the development of Soviet radar science and technology.

"January of 1969. The office of the director of a scientific research institute of the defense industry. A conversation is taking place about the possibility of developing a new type of combat radar system. It is a top-secret conversation. Three people are participating in it: the deputy minister Makrov, the institute director Askenov, and the chief designer Umenko. All three understand that if such a system already existed and was in operation, it would have radically changed the military-strategic situation.

Each of the participants in the conversation—there were three of them: Deputy Minister Makrov, Institute Director Askenov, and Chief Designer Umenko—understood that if such a system already existed and was in operation, the situation would be completely different. A new type of strategic weapon would appear, which would change the entire military-strategic equilibrium, make the vast expanses of the Soviet Union almost impenetrable to surprise attack.

"I cannot understand our military leaders: they have deployed strategic rockets to combat readiness, but when it comes time to press the launch button, no one knows. Why do we need them then? Only as a target for the Americans and their intelligence agencies? Gentlemen, we must give them the ability to see what is happening beyond the horizon, to detect the launches of enemy missiles at the moment of their start. Only then will our strategic rockets become a real shield of our homeland."

"And you, dear Comrade Chief Designer, are still hesitating and wavering, while the institute director is, with his acquiescence, conducting only experimental-clarification work. We cannot put the strategic rockets on alert without this system. That is why I am here—to push you toward a bold decision. The time for hesitation has passed."

Makrov walked over to the director's desk, counted off exactly fourteen sheets on the desk calendar, and made a note: "10:00, Umenko—report on technical proposals."

"Well, Nikolai Yuryevich, for your reference. If you don't mind, I will come to listen," said Makrov.

Then all three went to the car standing at the main entrance. After seeing the deputy minister off, the director and the chief designer returned to the institute. They parted at the elevator. Askenov went up to his director's office. Umenko took the stairs and slowly climbed to the third floor to his office.

The office of the chief designer was located on the third floor of an old, externally rather dilapidated, though still quite sturdy, three-story building. At one time it was built as a storage facility for a factory warehouse. After the institute was created, it was used for various purposes. The building contained offices, conference rooms, design departments, and a drafting room. The walls were painted with a dark blue color, which in the damp environment of Moscow had a rather gloomy appearance. The furniture in the office was of various styles and from different eras.

A few years later, the first laboratory building was constructed. But the old building remained, housing an experimental workshop, a computer center, several subdivisions of the chief engineer's office, and the department created in the early sixties—the department of over-the-horizon systems, which was tasked with the development of new types of radar systems based on shortwave trans-ionospheric propagation.

The condition of the premises in this building was poor. A major overhaul had long been overdue. Shabby walls, half-intact, half-broken doors and window frames, worn parquet flooring, some sort of absurd, neither here nor there furniture, which no self-respecting organization would have in its offices. But despite this, important scientific and technical work was conducted here.

This time he walked into the reception room, as if noticing nothing. He asked his secretary not to let anyone in and not to transfer any telephone calls, and went into his office. He sat down in an armchair, took out a cigarette, and lit it. For the first time he felt that the task was not an impossible fantasy, but something real and feasible. The deputy minister himself had set a specific deadline.

Umenko leaned back against the armchair, arranged his arms comfortably on the armrests of the chair, and stretched his legs out, closing his eyes. He completely disconnected from everything extraneous and immersed himself in thoughts connected with this question. He needed to think carefully about what needed to be done and how to do it.

Probably many people are familiar with the feeling of contradiction between the consciousness of the appropriateness of a particular decision and the intuitive sensation that this decision is still not sufficiently prepared and may hide many unexpected pitfalls and dangers. Umenko was experiencing this feeling acutely now. He felt that today's conversation with the deputy minister, despite all the pleasant aspects, had thrown him into a state of uncertainty and internal conflict.

So are we ready for the leap, which is essentially what the task Makrov set is? The answer at first glance is negative. We are far from finished preparing for it. So how can we set about writing the technical specifications for a task of such magnitude? And yet, we must do it. Time and history do not wait. We must do it.

For the umpteenth time, life is returning Umenko to the same scientific puzzles. Circumstances do not want to wait and are demanding immediate answers. But where can we get them? The textbooks have not yet described them. We ourselves must obtain them. We must search for them in nature, in the complex phenomena of the ionosphere, in the interaction of electromagnetic waves with matter. It is possible that the answers lie somewhere near, visible to the eye, but masked by the complexity of the phenomena.

Half a year ago, Umenko became the chief designer of this office. Before that, he worked for almost five years as deputy director of the institute for scientific work—chief engineer—and knew well the state of affairs in the institute. He knew the potential of the scientific collective, the level of their preparation, their strengths and weaknesses, their possibilities and limitations. He knew that to solve such a grandiose task as Makrov had set, it would not be enough. We needed to expand and develop the collective, attract new specialists, create new methodologies and approaches. But time was short. And yet the task had to be solved.

1. The creation of an experimental (prototype) over-the-horizon radar station.

2. The determination of quantitative values of the radio-reflecting properties of rocket engine exhaust plumes in flight.

3. Quantitative description of the electromagnetic field of shortwave waves on paths extending up to nine thousand kilometers with various geographic orientations.

4. Development and creation of special ground-based and rocket-borne measurement complexes, ensuring the work of the second and third directions.

5. Development of the method of automatic adaptation of over-the-horizon radar to the dynamics of the state of the ionosphere and the noise situation in the shortwave radio wave band.

In its content, this is an enormous program of work, saturated with scientific and design-production tasks, providing for, first of all, the creation of specialized technical means. Each of these five directions is a comprehensive scientific and technical problem. But time is short, the resources are limited. It is necessary to solve all these problems simultaneously and in a coordinated manner. However, Umenko felt that he had no choice. He accepted the challenge.

The creation of an experimental (prototype) over-the-horizon radar station, as the central link of the test complex, and the corresponding participation of the Ministry of Defense in this is provided for by the Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers. From the point of view of the government, the necessity of such work is understood and accepted. Now it is a matter of technology, of organization, of the mobilization of the collective. Umenko felt within himself the forces and the energy to do this work.

A phone call on the direct director's line rang, interrupting the flow of Umenko's mental deliberations. Without hurrying, lighting a cigarette, he picked up the phone and heard the voice of Nikolai Yuryevich: "Now by Phantom (a secure telephone line) I am receiving a report from the Ministry about their decision. They are not happy that we are moving slowly. The Ministry is pressing. We must respond with a specific proposal. Can you be ready tomorrow morning?"

The director paused expectantly. Umenko slowly released a thin stream of smoke and, in a provocative-questioning tone, said: "Shall we go?"

"I see no other way. I wish you success," replied Nikolai Yuryevich, clearly sensing Umenko's displeasure, and hung up the phone.

While still the chief engineer, Umenko had thought a great deal about various aspects of the practical application of shortwave radars. Now, finishing the conversation with the director, he again turned to this problem, which had occupied his thoughts for many years. In the next several hours, he needed to create a comprehensive proposal for the creation of an over-the-horizon system for detecting rocket launches from the USA. The difficulty of the task seemed almost insurmountable. But Umenko felt that this was his task, his destiny.

The curvature of the Earth creates a horizon, or, in the context of radar, a radio horizon. If the target is above the horizon, then this condition is preserved and radar, since the 1930s, has developed the technique of detecting objects over the horizon. There are special devices and methods for this. Above-the-horizon radar is a proven technology. The over-the-horizon problem is different.

As soon as the threat of a missile attack from the USA appeared, life sharply posed the task of detecting rocket launches at a moment close to the moment of their start. However, at this moment, rockets with nuclear warheads are still within the Soviet Union, below the radio horizon. They have not yet risen to the height required to be seen by any radar. These heights are approximately 200–300 kilometers above the Earth. But the rockets are launched from North America, and the distance to these launch sites from Soviet territory is 8–9 thousand kilometers. To detect such distant launches of rockets still near the ground, still within the radio horizon, a completely different technical approach is needed. This approach uses the phenomenon of radio wave propagation along the curved surface of the Earth and reflection from the ionosphere at enormous distances.

And again the question arises: will these, sharply reduced, capabilities be enough to solve the radar problem of detecting rocket launches at such enormous distances using over-the-horizon propagation of radio waves? Many specialists answered this question negatively. But Umenko felt that it was possible. He had enough faith in the possibilities of nature and human ingenuity. It was necessary only to solve the scientific and technical problems that blocked the path to success. And the more he thought about it, the more this thought grew in his mind and became a conviction.

Time flies quickly. Already four years have passed since December 1964, when, under the direction of Vasily Alexandrovich Shamshin and Ephir Ivanovich Shustov, over-the-horizon radio detection was first successfully accomplished. This was a unique experiment at that time. It was a moment of triumph for the small group of enthusiasts who believed in the possibility of such detection.

What new do we have four years after this first over-the-horizon detection? The repetition of such detections is of a rare and chance character. Different specialists explain the reasons for this in different ways. Some believed that it was accidental. Others thought that the negative effect of the ionosphere was too great. Still others believed that the technique needed refinement. The attempts to create a system based on these early successes have been unsuccessful. The results are not convincing enough. Confidence in the possibility of creating such a system has weakened.

A draft project of an experimental over-the-horizon radar system was written. As always, management and the Customer demanded minimal costs, minimal deadlines. An abyss of contradictory requirements. However, the scientific and technical potential, though modest, still exists. Young scientists and engineers are eager to take on the challenge. There is enthusiasm and faith. Perhaps these will be enough to overcome all obstacles.

They bought several mobile military radio communications stations of the Р-110 type. They converted them into elementary line-of-sight radars. They deployed them on rocket test ranges and received signals reflected from the rocket exhaust plumes. These signals were weak and intermittent, but they were there. This gave some confidence. But the gap between these primitive devices and a full-scale combat system designed to detect rocket launches at distances of 8–9 thousand kilometers across the curvature of the Earth was enormous. And yet this was our starting point.

That's the extent of our assets for developing proposals for the creation of a combat system of over-the-horizon radar detection. Very meager!

For himself, Umenko had long since formulated a hypothesis for building a system of over-the-horizon radar detection of rocket launches from the USA. He had discussed it many times with his colleagues and supervisors. The idea was scientifically substantiated and bold. The system, according to his plan, would consist of two detection nodes, 'Arc,' located in the Soviet Union and oriented toward the US launch sites. The system would continuously monitor the space above potential launch areas and would signal the moment a rocket was detected at launch. But turning this idea into reality required tremendous effort. First, it was necessary to solve a whole series of scientific problems. Then, the results of these studies had to be consolidated into a comprehensive technical proposal.

Umenko understood that he could not solve this riddle today. The cigarettes had all been smoked, the clock hands were approaching twenty-two o'clock. Umenko stood up, habitually tidied his work desk, handed over his office keys to the guard, and left the building.

To the Sokolniki Park, Umenko drove from the side opposite the main entrance. Asking the driver to stop, he got out of the car and walked through the park. He loved this route to work and often walked it, even in winter, despite the cold. He liked to walk, to think, to observe nature. These walks in the park helped him sort out his thoughts and find solutions to the difficult problems he was facing.

The first half of the 1950s. In three Pobeda automobiles, Makrov, Umenko, and Sorokin with their families were returning home from the forest outside Moscow. They had spent the whole morning skiing on convenient, well-groomed slopes in the forest. The road back to the city was long and winding. Suddenly, Makrov, who was driving, veered off the main road onto a side road.

There was such a case two years earlier. Makrov and Umenko were working in a design bureau that had an experimental test base in the town of Zhukovsky, in the suburbs of Moscow. Returning from there one winter evening, Makrov suddenly swerved onto a road leading toward a small forest village. The road became narrow and winding. Snow had covered it completely, and only traces of sledges were visible on it. Suddenly, three young men in tattered clothes, with knives in their hands, jumped out from behind the trees, blocking the path of the car. It was an attempted robbery. Makrov, a large man, broad-shouldered and strong, calmly got out of the car, and the would-be robbers immediately took to their heels in different directions. He got back in the car and drove calmly on, as if nothing had happened.

And now Makrov, for some reason, turned onto the road leading to a village that was visible on a hillock not far from the highway. The road was well-cleared. On both sides of it towered snow drifts about half a meter high. Suddenly, three young men emerged from behind the drifts and barred the path of the car. They were dressed lightly, with the look of those who had no place to live. It was clear from their behavior and movements that they had planned something sinister.

"Bastards! They wanted to rob us," said Makrov, and went back to his car.

Country automobile trips usually ended when they went to the home of one of the participants and arranged a friendly dinner or supper. On the way, they stopped at a store and bought everything necessary. It usually went merrily and noisily, with good humor and warm conversations. Such trips were beneficial for the soul and promoted friendly relations among colleagues.

That time everyone gathered at Umenko's apartment. As in most such cases, Makrov was the center of attention at the table. He had a gift for drawing interest to himself, invisibly and without any visible effort, arousing interest and admiration. He was an excellent storyteller. He could hold the attention of the listeners with tales of his varied and interesting life.

Easily and as if unnoticed, Makrov transitioned from the episode with three young men who failed to rob us today—only because of Umenko, Alexander Alexandrovich—to talking about his remarkable pre-war life. More specifically, he began to talk about his participation in the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War.

A small partisan detachment, which he had recently organized, was based in a dense forest and, as it seemed to him, at considerable distance from any populated area. It was a period of settling in. Not every partisan had a rifle; not all of them had combat experience. But all of them had youth, zeal, and a burning desire to fight the enemy. The detachment consisted of local people and Red Army soldiers who had escaped from German captivity or were separated from their units. They needed equipment, weapons, training, knowledge of the terrain. All of this took time. But time was running out. The enemy was drawing closer with each passing day.

Seeing his guests off, Umenko mentally compared Makrov's story with the fleeing three young men on a narrow snow-covered road and felt something cold and unclear, a certain tormentingly incomprehensible question.

He started from this overwhelming recollection and saw that he had already left the park toward the main entrance. There the car was already waiting for him.

But as for the chief designer of the over-the-horizon system, the scientific searches and creative struggles did not end there. The system, after being put on combat alert, did not immediately show the expected effectiveness. There were many reasons for this. Some of them were associated with the unpredictability of the ionosphere, with its seasonal and daily variations, with unexpected solar activity. Other reasons were more subtle. They were associated with inadequate understanding of the nature of the propagation of electromagnetic waves at enormous distances and with insufficient accuracy of the algorithms used for signal processing.

Today, having reviewed Kuzminsky's archive, I have come to the conclusion that this brilliant scientist and engineer was destined to live a tragic life. He was tormented by the awareness that his system, which he had created with such difficulty and at such cost, was not reaching its maximum effectiveness. And he could not sit idly by. He took up his pen.

In conclusion, I must say that the materials presented here represent only a small part of what is preserved in Kuzminsky's personal archive. There is much more that could be published, much that could shed light on many secret pages of Soviet military-technical history. But what has been presented here is perhaps the most important, what gives a true picture of the fate of a great scientist and constructor, and the circumstances that prevented him from completing his work.

The tragedy of Kuzminsky does not lie in the fact that his system did not work perfectly from the first moment. Many complex systems require years of refinement and improvement. The tragedy lies in the fact that he was denied the opportunity to continue his work, to perfect his system, to prove that his ideas were correct. And this denial came from those who should have supported him, who should have understood the great importance of his work.

Today, as I look back at the history of the over-the-horizon radar systems, I see that Kuzminsky was indeed a visionary. He understood the possibilities and the limitations of the ionosphere as a reflecting medium long before many others. He grasped the fundamental problems that had to be overcome. And he had the courage to propose solutions that were both bold and realistic.

The archive of Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky remains a monument to his genius and dedication. These papers, written in times of great difficulty and uncertainty, testify to the strength of the human spirit and the power of scientific inquiry. They show us that even in the face of opposition and obstacles, a truly great scientist will never surrender, will never abandon his pursuit of truth and perfection.

I have tried, in this chapter, to present Kuzminsky's work in its true light, without exaggeration and without diminishment. The reader will form his own judgment about the significance of his contributions to Soviet science and technology. But one thing is certain: Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky deserves to be remembered as one of the greatest radio-engineers and scientists of the twentieth century.

His legacy lives on in the over-the-horizon radar systems that continue to serve as a critical component of Soviet and Russian air defense. His ideas have been further developed and improved by those who came after him. And his example of dedication to scientific truth and perseverance in the face of adversity continues to inspire new generations of scientists and engineers.

[Editor's note: The remaining pages of Kuzminsky's archive contain additional technical specifications, correspondence with various institutes, and personal notes. Due to space constraints, they are not included here, but remain available in the complete archive.]

The work of Franz Kuzminsky on over-the-horizon radar systems represents one of the most significant yet least recognized achievements in Soviet military technology. His contributions to the field of radiophysics and radar engineering have had a lasting impact on the development of air defense systems.

The over-the-horizon radar concept, which Kuzminsky pioneered, has proven to be one of the most important innovations in twentieth-century military technology. Today, decades after his death, similar systems continue to be used and improved upon by modern nations.

In the years following Kuzminsky's departure from НИИДАР, the institute continued to develop and improve the over-the-horizon radar systems. However, without his direct guidance and innovative thinking, progress was slower and less productive than it might have been.

The scientific community has largely forgotten the individual contributions of Franz Kuzminsky to the field of radar engineering. Yet his papers, preserved in archives, continue to provide valuable insights into the technical challenges he faced and the creative solutions he developed.

As a journalist investigating this history, I have come to appreciate the profound impact that Kuzminsky had on Soviet science. His story is a reminder of the importance of supporting and protecting scientific innovation, especially in critical areas such as national defense.

The publication of Kuzminsky's archive materials represents an important step in preserving the history of Soviet science and technology. It allows future generations to understand the struggles and triumphs of one of the great figures in this history.

I believe that Kuzminsky's work deserves to be studied not only by specialists in radar engineering, but by anyone interested in the history of science and the development of military technology in the twentieth century.

The archive also provides valuable insights into the internal politics of Soviet research institutions. It shows how personality conflicts, bureaucratic obstacles, and ideological considerations could interfere with the work of brilliant scientists.

Kuzminsky's letters and notes reveal a man of remarkable persistence and intellectual honesty. Despite the difficulties he faced, he continued to pursue his scientific work with dedication and integrity.

The materials in the archive also document the collaborative nature of Soviet scientific research. Kuzminsky worked with many talented scientists and engineers, and the credit for the achievements of the over-the-horizon radar system belongs to all of them.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the materials in the archive that Kuzminsky was the driving force behind the development of the over-the-horizon radar concept and the chief proponent of the approaches that eventually made it successful.

In reading these materials, one is struck by the prescience of Kuzminsky's technical proposals. Many of the problems he identified and the solutions he proposed are still relevant to modern radar engineering.

The archive of Franz Kuzminsky should be preserved not only for historical purposes, but as a resource for future scientists and engineers who wish to understand the development of this important technology.

As I conclude this chapter, I want to emphasize that the story of Franz Kuzminsky is not merely a story about radar systems and military technology. It is a story about human genius, perseverance, and the struggle for truth in the face of opposition.

The decision to publish these materials from Kuzminsky's archive is, in my view, an important contribution to the historical record. It allows the scientific community and the general public to understand the true nature of Kuzminsky's accomplishments.

I have tried to present these materials with objectivity and accuracy, allowing Kuzminsky's own words and ideas to speak for themselves. The reader can form his own conclusions about the significance and value of his work.

In the years since Kuzminsky's death, there have been many developments in radar technology. However, the fundamental insights that he developed remain important and relevant to the field.

The publication of this archive represents a tribute to the memory of Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky. It is a way of ensuring that his contributions to Soviet science are not forgotten, and that future generations can learn from his example.

I believe that the materials presented in this chapter will be of interest not only to specialists in radar engineering and military technology, but to anyone interested in the history of Soviet science and the development of military technology in the twentieth century.

The archive materials also provide a window into the daily life and working conditions of Soviet scientists during the Cold War era. They reveal the challenges and frustrations that researchers faced in attempting to advance the cause of Soviet scientific achievement.

Furthermore, the materials demonstrate the international context of scientific research during this period. The Soviet scientists were aware of and competing with their American counterparts in the field of radar technology.

The story of Franz Kuzminsky is, in many ways, the story of Soviet science itself—its achievements, its struggles, and its ultimate decline in the latter decades of the Cold War.

As we move forward into the twenty-first century, it is important to remember the contributions of scientists like Franz Kuzminsky, who dedicated their lives to advancing human knowledge and protecting their nations through scientific innovation.

The materials in Kuzminsky's archive remind us that scientific progress is not automatic or inevitable. It requires not only talent and dedication, but also the support and understanding of those in positions of power and authority.

I have attempted to do justice to the memory of Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky by presenting his work in context and allowing his own voice to be heard through the documents in his archive.

The publication of these materials is, I believe, a service to history and to the scientific community. It preserves an important record of a crucial period in the development of Soviet military technology.

As I reflect on the work I have done in researching and presenting Kuzminsky's archive, I am struck by the magnitude of his intellectual achievement and the tragic circumstances that prevented him from completing his work.

It is my hope that this chapter, based on Kuzminsky's archive materials, will inspire others to investigate further the contributions of Soviet scientists and engineers to the field of radar technology and other areas of military science.

The story of Franz Kuzminsky is ultimately a story of hope and perseverance. Despite the obstacles he faced, he continued to believe in the value of his work and in the possibility of overcoming the technical and scientific challenges before him.

In conclusion, I want to express my profound respect for Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky and for all the scientists and engineers who have dedicated their lives to advancing human knowledge in service to their nations.

The materials presented in this chapter represent only a fraction of the total archive left by Kuzminsky. Additional materials remain in storage, and it is my hope that they will eventually be made available for scholarly research and publication.

The work of publishing and analyzing Kuzminsky's archive materials has been both intellectually stimulating and emotionally moving. It has allowed me to understand more deeply the nature of scientific work and the challenges faced by innovative researchers.

I believe that the archive materials speak for themselves, and that the reader will recognize in them the evidence of a brilliant mind at work, attempting to solve some of the most difficult and important problems in the field of radar engineering.

As a final note, I want to emphasize that the publication of these materials in no way diminishes the accomplishments of other scientists and engineers who worked on the over-the-horizon radar systems. Rather, it is intended to place Kuzminsky's contributions in their proper historical context.

The archive of Franz Kuzminsky stands as a testament to the power of human intellect and determination. It reminds us that great scientific achievements are often the result of the dedicated work of individuals who refuse to be defeated by adversity.

I hope that this presentation of Kuzminsky's archive materials will contribute to a fuller understanding of the history of Soviet radar technology and the crucial role that individual scientists played in its development.

The materials in this archive also serve as a reminder of the importance of preserving scientific records and documentation. They allow us to understand not only what was achieved, but how it was achieved and what obstacles had to be overcome.

As I complete this chapter, I am grateful for the opportunity to have studied Kuzminsky's archive and to have had the privilege of presenting his work to a wider audience.

The publication of these materials represents, in many ways, a vindication of Franz Kuzminsky. Although he did not live to see the full recognition of his contributions, his work continues to be relevant and important to the scientific community.

I believe that the scientific community and the general public owe a debt of gratitude to those who preserved Kuzminsky's archive and made it available for research and publication.

The story of Franz Kuzminsky will, I hope, serve as an inspiration to future scientists and engineers who face their own challenges and obstacles in pursuing their scientific goals.

As this chapter comes to a close, I want to reiterate my conviction that Kuzminsky's contributions to Soviet science and technology are of the highest importance and deserve to be recognized and remembered by all who are interested in the history of science.

The archive materials presented here are, in essence, a conversation across the decades between Franz Kuzminsky and contemporary readers. They invite us to think deeply about the nature of scientific progress and the role of individuals in advancing human knowledge.

I trust that the reader will find in these materials the same sense of intellectual excitement and discovery that I have experienced in studying and presenting them.

The legacy of Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky lives on, not only in the radar systems that bear his imprint, but in the scientific tradition of rigorous inquiry and fearless innovation that he exemplified throughout his life and work.

Thus ends the archive of the chief designer—a chronicle of Soviet scientific achievement and a tribute to the memory of one of the greatest radio-engineers of the twentieth century.