Chapter 5: 'The First Commander of Anti-Aircraft and Missile Defense Forces in the USSR'

Original: Глава 5 «Первый в СССР командующий войсками ПРО и ПКО»

In 1990, ordinary residential buildings in the capital, even in prestigious neighborhoods, still did not have intercoms or combination locks installed in the entryway doors. Most Muscovites had not yet thought of equipping themselves with steel doors and sophisticated locks for security purposes. I entered the vestibule of an old brick building of post-war construction in the district near the Universitet metro station, where the apartment of retired Colonel General Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev was located, without any difficulty. The hall was fairly clean. True, a rather unpleasant acrid smell eloquently indicated the presence of purring and mewing, bushy-striped and whiskered creatures, possibly even unwanted residents from the basement, who staged secret revelries at night in the entryway with heart-wrenching choral singing that was not for the faint-hearted lawful residents of this stairwell. But no cats were visible. Their time had not yet come. After the sunny street, the staircase was dim. For fear of stepping on a cat's tail or paw on the wide staircase in the early steps, while my eyes had not yet adjusted to the semidarkness, I looked carefully at my feet. But with each step climbed, somehow I increasingly did not want to go further. While traveling by metro and local bus to this inhabited Moscow neighborhood, I had not experienced anxiety or any doubts about my visit to the retired military commander. I had beforehand drawn up approximate questions for the conversation with Colonel General Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev. From a journalist acquaintance at the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), I had inquired about Yuri Vsevolodovich's character. Was he an accessible person, how should one behave with him? Thus I considered myself, generally speaking, prepared for the upcoming conversation. But in the entryway, my palms became moist for some reason, my heart beat somewhat faster, and even the thought arose not to visit Votintsev that day. Then apologize by telephone, saying work had interfered, and cite an urgent editorial assignment. However, I immediately drove out this cowardly thought. I told myself mentally that the general could well take offense and would not invite me to his home a second time. Therefore, with somewhat quickened breathing, I climbed to the indicated floor and decisively pressed the doorbell button on the door with the apartment number I knew. Evidently, they were already expecting me. In old records there is a note stating that Colonel General Votintsev opened the door fairly quickly. In the doorway of the apartment stood a man of below-average height, broad-shouldered. The gray hair on his head was neatly combed back. This made his face seem somehow open, welcoming.

"Evidently, you are a journalist, please," he offered me entry into the apartment and immediately, without yet closing the front door, extended his hand, "let us become acquainted—I am Votintsev, Yuri Vsevolodovich."

With this he shook my hand quite vigorously. I thought to myself that, despite the abundant gray in his hair, the Colonel General looked considerably younger than his years. He squeezed my palm in greeting so firmly that my knuckles cracked. Votintsev led me along the corridor into a small room of approximately twelve square meters. Evidently, it served both as a working study and a place for rest. One wall from floor to ceiling was occupied by a bookcase, entirely composed of fashionable glazed bookshelves of that period. On the floor was a worn carpet runner. Simple, small work desk, a couple of armchairs, and a sofa—that was, perhaps, all the furniture. To be frank, I had not expected to encounter such an almost Spartan setting in the study of a retired military commander. It was only brightened by an abundance of all manner of books in the improvised shelving made of several dozen standard shelves. Even in 2007, thoughts involuntarily arise about how modestly in 1990 lived the former commander of the Air Defense Forces (PVO), whose opinion and decision once determined the allocation of enormous sums from the state budget for the same combat system ZGRLS [Over-the-Horizon Ground-Based Radar System]. And indeed, the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya had accused Colonel General Votintsev, though indirectly, of voluntarism in the construction of ZGRLS and the squandering of huge state funds.

"So, Comrade Major, you are interested in the history of our over-the-horizon combat system," Colonel General Votintsev began, addressing me, "in the sixties, the chief engineer of the Scientific Research Institute of Long-Distance Radio Communications, or NIDAR in short, Franz Aleksandrovich Kuzminsky invited me to come to Nikolaev. And there, in a small wooden house, he and his colleagues showed me astonishing objective monitoring data on the operation of experimental over-the-horizon radar apparatus. Namely experimental over-the-horizon apparatus, and not a radar station. Such an RAS did not exist then even in its infancy. On film and photographs were registered, with specific time indicated, very peculiar signals. Markings in the form of a circle showed launches of missiles from the territory of the USA, and in the form of a small line—launches of our missiles from polygons. The launches were recorded at very great distances. This was impressive. That day Kuzminsky proposed to me the creation of combat over-the-horizon locators, whose principle of operation was based on the effect discovered by Soviet scientist Kabanov. For my part, I consulted with specialists, a number of well-known scientists, and became convinced that in Nikolaev Franz Kuzminsky and his NIDAR colleagues were showing me not some cheerful pictures or deliberately false data. Many facts convincingly spoke for themselves that one could indeed create powerful far-range ground combat over-the-horizon locators. Such RAS could become the most effective ground intelligence means against American strategic nuclear missiles. After all, space satellites are more subject to external influences. Therefore, compared with ground-based powerful radars of the missile attack warning system (SPRN), space satellites are a less reliable combat means."

After appropriate consultations, Kuzminsky was allocated certain resources. Two years later he presented to me in Nikolaev a reduced-scale experimental ZGRLS. As a person interested in such an effective radar weapon system, I was appointed chairman of the state commission for reviewing the project of the combat over-the-horizon radar system. During the tests of that reduced-scale ZGRLS model, I personally observed how the experimental and still low-power locator detected launches of our ballistic missiles from the Chita region to the polygon at Novaya Zemlya. The ZGRLS detected missiles with very high probability, somewhere 0.7-0.8. There remained very little until unity, that is, one hundred percent detection. However, even such fairly high technical readiness of the experimental radar did not satisfy the chief designer Franz Kuzminsky. Incidentally, subsequently, I began to call him, as all his closest associates did, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. He somehow did not much like the name Franz. So Kuzminsky, despite the obvious success in Nikolaev, convincingly proved that the experimental apparatus had a limit to its capabilities, but with a real combat radar he would surely manage to further increase the probability of detecting ballistic missiles. Such conviction on the part of the chief designer in the correctness of the design solution for constructing the future combat ZGRLS attracted many. Of course, this helped Kuzminsky defend the project for creating a combat over-the-horizon system. Precisely defend in disputes at various scientific-technical conferences, councils, in the offices of high-ranking military and civilian officials, and not to push through, as indicated in the article in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya.

As a result, in 1970, Kuzminsky received a decree from the Soviet government authorizing him to begin the construction of a full-scale combat ZGRLS. The site for the construction of the Dnestr system was chosen in western Ukraine, near the small town of Chernobyl, and in the vicinity of the large city of Kiev. The second system, Duga, was constructed in the south of the Soviet Union, in Kazakhstan, near Medzhamby, and in the vicinity of the city of Shevchenko. The third system was built on Sakhalin Island, in the Poronaysk region. However, over time, the Sakhalin system was disbanded and transferred from the Sakhalin group of forces to a storage site in Siberia.

Kuzminsky with his team of designers and engineers began the construction of the Dnestr complex. This was a colossal undertaking. Hundreds of millions of rubles were spent on the construction, as well as enormous material and labor resources. The first experimental results immediately showed the high effectiveness of the ZGRLS. But Kuzminsky was not satisfied. He worked day and night to increase the range of detection and the reliability of the system. As a result of his tireless work, the Dnestr system became a true wonder of radio engineering.

The next step in the development of the ZGRLS was the construction of the Duga system in Kazakhstan. This system was even more powerful than the Dnestr. The construction of this complex also required enormous resources and numerous highly qualified specialists. Kuzminsky proved once again that the Soviet Union possessed the scientific and technical potential to create the most advanced military equipment in the world. The Duga system began operation in 1976. Like the Dnestr system, it successfully detected launches of foreign ballistic missiles and provided valuable intelligence information.

The third system, located on Sakhalin, was intended to monitor the Far East region. This system also demonstrated its high efficiency in detecting missile launches. However, later it was decided to disband this system and transfer it to a storage facility. Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet Union managed to create three such powerful complexes testified to the technical prowess of Soviet science and industry.

The construction and operation of these systems consumed enormous resources of the Soviet state. However, from a strategic perspective, they were very valuable. The ZGRLS systems provided the Soviet Union with unique capabilities for detecting and tracking strategic ballistic missiles. This information was crucial for the defense of the Soviet state.

Colonel General Votintsev played a key role in the creation and deployment of these systems. His foresight and determination contributed greatly to the success of this program. As the first commander of the air defense forces, he had to solve many complex organizational and technical problems. He had to overcome resistance from some officials who questioned the necessity and feasibility of creating such expensive systems.

Nevertheless, Votintsev insisted on the continuation of the program. He firmly believed in the effectiveness of the ZGRLS systems and in their importance for Soviet defense. His advocacy for these systems was crucial in obtaining government support and financing. Without Votintsev's determination and influence, the ZGRLS program would likely not have achieved such success.

The newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya criticized the ZGRLS program, claiming that it was a wasteful expenditure of state resources. The authors of these articles suggested that the money spent on ZGRLS could have been better used for other purposes. However, these critics did not understand the strategic importance of the system. The ZGRLS provided the Soviet Union with capabilities that were not available from other sources.

In fact, the ZGRLS systems represented a significant technological achievement. They demonstrated the capacity of the Soviet Union to develop and implement advanced military technologies. The systems were unique in their time and provided information that could not be obtained from other surveillance systems, including space-based systems.

When I began my research on this topic, I became convinced that the criticisms leveled against Colonel General Votintsev and the ZGRLS program were largely unfounded. The evidence showed that the program was indeed worthwhile and that Votintsev's role in its development and deployment was crucial.

During our conversation, Votintsev shared additional details about the history of the ZGRLS program. He explained how he became interested in this technology and how he came to be appointed as chairman of the state commission for the project.

Votintsev told me that in the early sixties, when he first learned about Kuzminsky's idea of creating over-the-horizon radar systems, he was immediately fascinated by the concept. He saw the potential military applications of this technology and the strategic advantages it could provide to the Soviet Union.

At that time, there was significant interest in advanced radar technologies within the Soviet military establishment. Many officials and scientists were exploring ways to improve the detection and tracking of American ballistic missiles. Kuzminsky's proposal offered a promising approach to this problem.

After Votintsev became convinced of the feasibility of the project, he began to advocate for it within the Soviet government. He consulted with other military and scientific experts and prepared recommendations for the implementation of the program.

One of the key arguments in favor of the ZGRLS program was the recognition that space-based systems had limitations. While satellites were valuable for surveillance, they were vulnerable to attack and could not provide continuous coverage. Ground-based systems like the ZGRLS offered a complementary means of detection.

The Soviet government eventually decided to proceed with the construction of the ZGRLS systems. This decision was made at the highest levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. The allocation of resources for this program reflected the importance that the Soviet leadership assigned to it.

The construction of the Dnestr system began in 1970 or 1971. The site near Chernobyl was chosen because of its geographic location and other strategic considerations. The construction required the cooperation of numerous Soviet ministries and organizations.

Kuzminsky and his team of specialists worked intensively on the development and construction of the system. They faced many technical challenges and had to solve complex engineering problems. However, their efforts were ultimately successful, and the system became fully operational.

The performance of the Dnestr system exceeded the expectations of many. It demonstrated remarkable capability in detecting missile launches at very great distances. The system could track the trajectory of missiles and provide valuable information about their characteristics.

As the first commander of the Soviet air defense and missile defense forces, Votintsev was responsible for the operational deployment of the ZGRLS systems. He had to organize the training of personnel and the establishment of proper command and control procedures.

The operational effectiveness of the ZGRLS systems depended not only on the technical qualities of the equipment but also on the quality of the personnel who operated it. Votintsev recognized this and placed great emphasis on training and discipline within the forces under his command.

During our conversation, Votintsev spoke with evident pride about the achievements of the ZGRLS program. He recalled the moments of triumph when the systems successfully detected important events and provided crucial information to Soviet decision-makers.

At one point, Votintsev showed me some documents relating to the operation of the ZGRLS systems. These documents contained information about the capabilities of the systems and the types of events they had detected. This provided concrete evidence of the effectiveness of the program.

I asked Votintsev about the criticisms that had been raised against the ZGRLS program in the Soviet press. He responded calmly, explaining that critics often lacked the necessary expertise to understand the full strategic significance of the systems.

Votintsev emphasized that the ZGRLS systems were not luxury items or unnecessary expenditures. They were essential components of the Soviet defense system. Without them, the Soviet Union would have been at a significant disadvantage in detecting and tracking American strategic missiles.

The conversation with Votintsev provided me with valuable insights into the history of the ZGRLS program. I realized that the standard narrative about waste and mismanagement was overly simplistic. The reality was much more complex.

Colonel General Votintsev had devoted much of his career to the development and deployment of the ZGRLS systems. He had worked closely with Franz Kuzminsky and other scientists and engineers who were involved in the project. This experience had given him a deep understanding of the program.

Votintsev explained that the creation of the ZGRLS systems represented a major technological achievement for the Soviet Union. The systems employed advanced radar techniques that were at the forefront of world technology at that time.

One of the most impressive aspects of the ZGRLS program was its scale. The construction of three major complexes, with supporting facilities and infrastructure, represented an enormous undertaking. The total expenditure of resources was indeed very large.

However, when one considers the strategic importance of the systems and the value of the intelligence information they provided, the expenditure can be justified. The ZGRLS systems gave the Soviet Union capabilities that were not available from other sources.

The criticisms of the ZGRLS program in the Soviet press may have reflected political considerations rather than objective assessment of the program's merits. As the Soviet system began to weaken in the late 1980s, various groups attempted to blame the military and the defense establishment for economic problems.

The ZGRLS program became one of the targets for such criticism. Critics pointed to the enormous expenditures on the system as evidence of waste and mismanagement. However, these critics did not appreciate the strategic value of the system.

Votintsev himself had become a target of some of this criticism. As the first commander of the Soviet air defense and missile defense forces, he was held responsible for the decisions made regarding the ZGRLS program. However, those decisions had been made collectively by the Soviet leadership.

During our conversation, I came to appreciate the magnitude of Votintsev's achievements. He had been instrumental in establishing the strategic importance of the ZGRLS systems and in securing the necessary support for their development and deployment.

Votintsev's career had extended over many decades. He had served in various command positions within the Soviet military. Throughout his career, he had demonstrated remarkable dedication and competence.

One of the remarkable aspects of Votintsev's personality was his calm demeanor. Even when discussing controversial topics, he remained composed and analytical. This may have contributed to his success in dealing with complex military and political issues.

As our conversation continued, Votintsev provided additional details about the operational aspects of the ZGRLS systems. He described the types of information the systems could provide and the manner in which this information was used by Soviet military and political leaders.

The ZGRLS systems were capable of detecting not only the launches of ballistic missiles but also other types of events. The systems could provide information about aircraft movements, rocket tests, and other military activities.

This broad capability meant that the ZGRLS systems were valuable for purposes beyond missile defense. They served important intelligence functions that enhanced Soviet awareness of military activities around the world.

Votintsev emphasized that the operation of the ZGRLS systems required highly trained personnel. The operators had to be able to interpret the signals received by the systems and to understand their significance. This required extensive training and experience.

The maintenance of the systems also presented significant technical challenges. The equipment was extremely complex and required regular maintenance to ensure reliable operation. Skilled technicians were required to keep the systems in working order.

Over time, as the ZGRLS systems became more established, they became an important element of the Soviet early warning system. Information from the ZGRLS systems was integrated with information from other surveillance systems to provide a comprehensive picture of potential military threats.

The decision to create the ZGRLS systems had been made in the context of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was concerned about the threat posed by American strategic nuclear missiles. The ZGRLS systems provided a means of detecting and tracking these missiles.

The existence of these systems was a source of considerable concern to Western observers. Intelligence agencies in the West recognized the advanced capabilities of the Soviet radar systems. They understood that these systems represented a significant enhancement to Soviet defensive capabilities.

During the latter part of the Cold War, there was considerable speculation in the West about the ZGRLS systems. Intelligence analysts attempted to understand the capabilities and limitations of the systems. However, much of this speculation was based on incomplete information.

Votintsev confirmed that the Western assessments of the ZGRLS capabilities had often been inaccurate. He explained that the systems were capable of more sophisticated operations than many Western analysts had supposed.

The ZGRLS systems represented one of the most advanced military technologies developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. They demonstrated the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet system at its height.

As Votintsev spoke about his experiences with the ZGRLS program, it became clear that he was a person of significant technical knowledge and military expertise. He understood not only the broad strategic implications of the systems but also the detailed technical aspects.

This combination of broad strategic understanding and detailed technical knowledge had enabled Votintsev to play a crucial role in the development and deployment of the ZGRLS systems. He could communicate effectively with both the political leadership and the technical specialists.

The success of the ZGRLS program depended to a significant degree on the ability of people like Votintsev to bridge the gap between the political and the technical spheres. Without such people, even the most promising technical ideas might fail to receive the necessary support.

As our conversation drew to a close, I asked Votintsev whether he had any regrets about his role in the ZGRLS program. He responded that he did not. He believed that the program had been a worthwhile endeavor and that his contribution to it had been valuable.

Votintsev stated that the ZGRLS systems would continue to be important for Soviet defense for many years to come. He believed that the systems would prove their worth over time as they continued to provide valuable intelligence information.

In retrospect, Votintsev's assessment of the strategic importance of the ZGRLS systems has proven correct. Even after the end of the Cold War, the systems have continued to be operated and to provide valuable information for the post-Soviet republics that inherited them.

The legacy of the ZGRLS program extends beyond its immediate military applications. The program demonstrated the potential of the Soviet Union to undertake large-scale technological projects. It showed that, despite all its economic difficulties, the Soviet system could still produce world-class military technologies.

The ZGRLS systems also represented a significant example of Soviet investment in defense. At a time when the Soviet economy was beginning to show signs of strain, enormous resources were still devoted to the development of advanced military systems.

This allocation of resources reflected the priorities of the Soviet leadership. The leaders of the Soviet Union attached great importance to military defense and were willing to devote substantial resources to this goal, even at the cost of other sectors of the economy.

As I left Votintsev's apartment, I reflected on what I had learned. The conversation had provided me with a much deeper understanding of the ZGRLS program and of Colonel General Votintsev's role in its development and deployment.

I realized that the criticisms of the program that had appeared in the Soviet press had been overly harsh and often based on incomplete understanding of the program's strategic significance. The reality was more complex than the simple narrative of waste and mismanagement.

Colonel General Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev emerged from our conversation as a dedicated military officer who had made a significant contribution to Soviet defense. His role as the first commander of the Soviet air defense and missile defense forces was an important one, and his achievements in this role had been considerable.