Chapter 14: "Russia Possesses Combat OTH-R Systems"

Original: Глава 14 «У России имеются боевые ЗГРЛС»

Of course, Russia is not the Soviet Union with its enormous economic and military potential. But even in modern conditions, Russia found the resources to create over-the-horizon radars. The foundation for them was created by Franz Kuzminsky and other scientists from NIIDAR. Kuzminsky's like-minded colleagues did not abandon this extremely complex work—which promised no great profits—during the market turmoil, and quietly, without fanfare, created a new Russian radar marvel. Under the direction of Chief Designer Fyodor Fyodorovich Evstratov, unique over-the-horizon radar complexes (OTRN) were created. The task of detecting surface and air targets in both the near and far ionospheric zone was solved.

For the curiosity of readers, I will relate that this work began back in 1982. During that period, according to Retired Lieutenant General Mikhail Markovich Kolomiyets, Hero of Socialist Labor and head of the special directorate for the introduction of PVO, PRO, SPRN systems at the 4th Main Directorate of the General Staff—persecutions against Franz Kuzminsky began. As General Kolomiyets noted, some officials, including former colleagues of Kuzminsky, attempted to blame the chief designer for errors in creating the combat over-the-horizon system. "But this is not so," the general declared categorically, "Kuzminsky was a man of high organizational abilities, expressing his thoughts clearly and logically, and approached his work with complete dedication. The leitmotif of his activities was: 'We do immediately what is difficult, and what is impossible—a little later.' A product of KB-1, he spared neither himself nor his subordinates in his work. Regarding over-the-horizon location and the problems that arose, Mikhail Markovich spoke very directly, in a military manner: 'I will say only that the problem proved significantly more complex, certainly not due to the chief designer's fault. At that time, knowledge of the ionosphere's state, especially in northern latitudes, was insufficient. And this was not his fault, but his misfortune—it required coordination of efforts from dozens of research institutes, at minimum by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences'."

I have already noted that Franz Kuzminsky found himself in extremely difficult conditions. He and his team worked on an extraordinarily complex, science-intensive problem. He was close to solving the mystery of nature. But time and circumstances were against him.

At the same time, the Soviet Navy became interested in the capabilities of combat OTH-R systems. In 1982, Evstratov proposed to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to use OTH-R systems to monitor surface and air conditions via surface wave mode in the near 200-nautical-mile zone, and in the far zone, on the order of 3,000 kilometers, to conduct radar reconnaissance through the ionosphere by means of space wave mode. The Navy Commander-in-Chief was aware of the situation that had developed with combat OTH-R systems for the Air Defense Forces. However, the naval experts objectively reviewed Evstratov's proposal, and Gorshkov did not hesitate to take upon himself the responsibility for allocating funds for their creation. The construction of the naval OTH-R system was sanctioned by a special resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR on December 24, 1982. It was named "Volna" (Wave). Chief Designer Evstratov and his collective of scientists and engineers designed this OTH-R system with maximum mobility in mind. All equipment, including the powerful computing complex, was housed in transportable cabins. This significantly reduced the costs of the radar itself. The site needed only a small area for placing the cabins and cable infrastructure. The radar used the newest type of antenna. With a length of 1,500 meters, it had a height of only 5 meters. In terms of metal consumption and the volume of construction and assembly work, this antenna was hundreds of times smaller than previous antennas for OTH-R air defense radars. The Navy approached the creation of its system with considerable speed. In 1983, a location was selected near the city of Nakhodka on the Pacific coast in one of the bays for the deployment of "Volna." In 1984, construction of a residential settlement, engineering systems, and a radar site began.

The OTH-R system "Volna" was a complex and science-intensive facility. Based on experience with creating radars for the Air Defense Forces, a Far East Industrial-Technical Enterprise was established to conduct installation and adjustment work.

Scientific and technical direction of the facility's creation and development of the software-algorithmic complex was carried out by Deputy Chief Designer Valentin Nikolaevich Strelkin, Deputy Chief Designer Efir Ivanovich Shustov, Viktor Andreyevich Sobchuk, and the collectives of developers entrusted to them.

The first phase of the OTH-R system "Volna" was constructed by 1986. It was used for experimental work on detecting in the near zone the research vessel "Okean" (Ocean), a Sentry Ship of the Pacific Fleet "Letuchiy" (Flying One). Scientists and designers conducted this work until September 1987. As a result, an over-the-horizon detection range for ships via surface wave exceeding 300 kilometers was achieved. Thereafter, scientists and designers began working to enable the OTH-R system to detect surface and air objects at ranges up to 3,000 km within the first ionospheric hop. In 1987, positive detection results for ships and aircraft at ranges up to 2,800 kilometers were first recorded. This made it possible to complete the experimental work and proceed with further equipping of this radar to the experimental prototype stage.

From 1987 to 1990, work was conducted on modernizing the software-algorithmic complex of the OTH-R system "Volna" and increasing its energy potential. This work proved so successful that in 1990 the radar reliably detected and tracked U.S. carrier battle groups in the Pacific Ocean at ranges exceeding 3,000 kilometers.

State trials of the OTH-R system "Volna" were conducted in 1992. The radar detected ships and air targets via space wave beam at ranges of 1,000–3,000 kilometers. That same year, the locator was transferred to the Russian Navy. It was accepted into service with the Pacific Fleet to solve problems of detecting surface and air targets.

In 1999, NIIDAR, with the direct support of the Navy, built an experimental low-power OTH-R surface wave system named "Teletc" (Taurus) on the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the autumn of that same year, "Teletc" detected ships of the U.S. Navy at ranges up to 250 kilometers and also conducted over-the-horizon detection of aircraft.

Possibly, soon one could relate information about new over-the-horizon radars successfully used for air defense purposes. But here it is necessary to note the following points.

Several years ago in open foreign publications, information could be gleaned about developments underway in the West and especially in the USA of a fundamentally new class of weapons for use in the aerospace sphere of armed struggle. These are hypersonic aircraft (HSVA). They are capable of operating in the air and in space, and rapidly transitioning from one medium to another. And then suddenly this flow of information dried up. Only in certain specialized publications could one learn that work on HSVA is increasingly acquiring a practical orientation—that is, working drawings and models may soon transform into real ultra-modern aircraft. They will be practically invulnerable. Naturally, the Russian Ministry of Defense became concerned about the appearance of such a class of weapons. In addition, NATO was expanding relentlessly and increasing its already enormous potential of air attack means. And in Russia, much of the territory remained without radar coverage. Not just HSVA—ordinary foreign helicopters could cross borders with impunity. Therefore, as early as November 2002, the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense reviewed and approved a draft concept for creating a system of aerospace defense of the state. The document is quite extensive. All main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces of Russia, military-scientific centers participated in its development. The document contains sections on constructing Russia's aerospace defense system, the stages of this work. In short, all major questions were taken into account, new threats were identified, and methods for dealing with them were determined. I will not recount the entire document. I will only note that along with creating advanced means of striking a potential adversary's aerospace targets, the proposal includes improving command and control systems for troops, and most importantly, developing the missile attack warning system and the radio-technical troops of the Air Defense Forces. All is clear and understandable. One must be prepared to repel possible new threats such as aerospace operations in Yugoslavia or Iraq.

The problem of new forms of armed struggle is also actively discussed by the Independent Expert Council on Aerospace Defense Problems. Our state has such an organ, to which well-known scientists and military personnel belong. Thus, at the meeting of the presidium of this council on June 8, 2007, co-chairman of the council General of the Army Anatoly Mikhailovich Kornukov reported that based on the results of reviewing the development of a new OTH-R system as early as October 2006, an appeal was sent to the Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of Russia—First Deputy Chairman of the Government of Russia Sergei Borisovich Ivanov—regarding support for this work being conducted by JSC "NPK 'NIIDAR'." The appeal was, so to speak, heard and carefully read. As a result, the apparatus of the Government of Russia sent appropriate directives to a number of agencies. From them, the council on aerospace defense problems, according to General of the Army Kornukov, received letters. For example, Acting Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of Russia V.G. Mikheev reported that proposals from the Independent Expert Council on Aerospace Defense Problems would be taken into account when formulating the plan for implementing the Aerospace Defense Concept. The council's proposals regarding OTH-R systems were also supported by Deputy Chief of the Federal Agency for Industry Stanislav Borisovich Puginskiy. So why has support for creating an advanced OTH-R system not yet been forthcoming, and why is it needed at all?

These and other questions were answered in a conversation by Sergei Konstantinovich Kolganov, member of the council on aerospace defense problems, deputy general director of JSC "Design Bureau-1," Doctor of Technical Sciences, former chief of the directorate for orders and deliveries of weapons to the Air Defense Forces, Retired Major General:

"Our appeal to the First Deputy Chairman of the Government of Russia Sergei Borisovich Ivanov was prompted by the necessity to support this direction of radar technology. Over-the-horizon radar location and the latest developments in OTH-R systems have become even more relevant for the defensive capacity of the state due to financial constraints. After all, previously in the Soviet Union, OTH-R systems solved the problem of increasing warning time for rocket-nuclear attack. In the created Missile-Space Defense system, OTH-R systems complemented information from the satellite warning system, which was created by Anatoly Ivanovich Savin. This was necessary to increase the reliability of information from the satellite system because initially it functioned poorly. And second, it is always better to have two sources of such strategic information than one."

The OTH-R project for the Air Defense Forces "Duga" (Arch), as is well known, was the first attempt at practical implementation of combat over-the-horizon location. But this attempt, in my view, was excessively bold for its time. The OTH-R system was supposed to detect launching American ballistic missiles on the third hop after two reflections of radar energy from the ionosphere. But the attenuation of the radar signal propagating over enormous distances was colossal; therefore, the first OTH-R systems required colossal electrical power. For this reason, the reliability of the combat stations of Chief Designer Franz Kuzminsky was not high. Furthermore, the operation of those OTH-R systems depended very heavily on the current state of the ionosphere, which, as is known, unstably "breathes." It was extremely difficult to forecast this "breathing" and, accordingly, the propagation of radio waves in the ionosphere. And although serious measures were undertaken in "Duga" to compensate for this effect and other problems, the excessively bold project often reached impasses during the refinement of already-created combat systems.

After the construction of an experimental OTH-R system in the city of Nikolayev, the number of both supporters and skeptics of this bold project only increased. Moreover, in the course of further development, it became clear that the radar beam was not reflected from a point in the ionosphere but from an area which, as I have already noted, unstably "breathes." Only about ten years after these works began did NIIDAR substantially redesign the antenna system and the station's operating algorithms, and identified the observed phenomenon of special reflection from the ionosphere—terming it "grazing incidence mode." After this, countermeasures were adopted in the OTH-R system's equipment and algorithm, yielding more or less stable detection results.

But few know that parallel with the "Duga" project, within the framework of the "Shchit" (Shield) system, which was to counter the threat of U.S. cruise missiles, work began at NIIDAR on creating a single-hop OTH-R system. This station was supposed to cover our North with a radar field. But at that time this work was halted due to the presence in northern latitudes of the so-called auroral zones of the ionosphere. They produce unpredictable radar beam reflections. And they effectively constitute a very powerful source of interference for OTH-R systems. Therefore, the anti-aircraft OTH-R system within the "Shchit" system was closed. But work on "Duga" continued and began yielding very stable detections. The experimental OTH-R system near Nikolayev played an enormous role in this extremely complex undertaking, because all the technologies that NIIDAR would successfully use for creating a new generation of OTH-R systems were worked out on it. It was not without reason that Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky created the Nikolayev branch and invested so much effort and energy in it.

In 1986, as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the western node of "Duga-1" fell into the exclusion zone and was closed. And practically immediately, a decision was made to cease work on the eastern node "Duga-2." The facility was supposedly mothballed. But thank God that owing to the chief theoretician of over-the-horizon location, Doctor of Technical Sciences Efir Ivanovich Shustov, in creating the second generation OTH-R systems, new principles and new technologies were employed. Above all, the principle of surface wave was established, which the Navy literally enthusiastically supported. In parallel, an OTH-R system "Konteyner" (Container) was being developed for the Air Defense Forces. It was a mobile variant of the radar. However, the first purchasers of this new generation Russian combat OTH-R systems were the Chinese. In our own Air Defense Forces, a certain distrust of over-the-horizon radars continues to persist. Surprisingly, the development of OTH-R systems for the Air Defense Forces was supported not by the radio-technical troops but by air defense intelligence. "Konteyner" allows for solving various tasks in the interests of intelligence. Even a map of "Konteyner" OTH-R placement throughout the country's territory was already developed. This made it possible in very short timeframes to completely cover the entire territory of the state with a radar field and conduct aerial reconnaissance even beyond borders to timely identify conflict situations. The radar possessed a detection range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers for detecting aircraft.

But earlier, if the serious problem was project approval, now the problem of money has been added. In conditions where Russia's Ministry of Defense currently cannot afford to create even a semblance of the unified radar field that existed over the state during the Soviet period, only "Konteyner" can somehow ensure the security of the state's airspace. It will provide timely information warning of air attack or its threat. But unfortunately, the OTH-R system "Konteyner" has not yet been delivered to Russian forces. There are only individual examples of this radar.

At one of the sessions of the Independent Council on Aerospace Defense Problems, a presentation by NIIDAR on OTH-R systems was heard. The Council on Aerospace Defense actively supported this direction of radar development. After all, currently the use of combat OTH-R systems in air defense is the only way to create in the state at least a minimal system of information warning about aviation flights within Russia. By other means, due to insufficient allocations for defense, it is inconceivable to create a continuous radar field. One needs only 10–12 OTH-R "Konteyner" systems to create a unified radar field for the state. Ordinary radar stations for this would require thousands. One "Konteyner" will operate in a band of 1,000–2,000 kilometers and in a 180-degree sector. I think that besides aircraft, it will soon detect ballistic missiles as well. The first "Konteyner" was tested and demonstrated stable detection of targets as early as the beginning of 2000. But it has not yet been accepted into service with the Russian Army.

Yes, the merits of Franz Kuzminsky in Russian over-the-horizon radar location are evident. In my view, articles by Kisunko in "Sovetskaya Rossiya" (Soviet Russia), popular during the Soviet period, and in other publications are extremely biased. These are the emotions of a prominent leader who did not forgive certain people for his resignation from high office. However, behind Kisunko's statements, obviously someone stood, or there were certain forces in the state who knew his attitude toward Markov, Nenashev, and skillfully used him to strike at the combat OTH-R system, and thereby also at the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex of the entire state as a whole.

Currently, over-the-horizon location, both with surface wave and classical variants, is vitally necessary for solving anti-aircraft defense tasks in a possible aerospace war. Our state will not soon be able, based on its financial capabilities, to restore the ground radar field to the required level. I repeat that now only "Konteyners" can create a continuous radar field. With its help, targets can be guided for our combat fighter aviation. For air defense missile forces, for the time being "Konteyners" provide imprecise information. There is a certain problem here, but it is quite solvable. Incidentally, new automated control systems for troops already account for integration with the OTH-R "Konteyner."

Sergei Konstantinovich Kolganov provided quite interesting information for the book. Of course, I attempted to track, using my resources, the subsequent fate of the directive to support the creation of OTH-R systems in the interests of Russia's aerospace defense from the First Deputy Chairman of the Government of Russia Sergei Ivanov. The directive proceeded from him to the Federal Agency for Industry and to the Ministry of Economy and Trade. And there this directive somehow quietly became dormant, or the officials buried it in their desk drawers. In my view, forces from abroad who obstruct the newest Russian military developments are not to blame for this. Rather, the Markov-Kuzminsky conflict continues in the second generation. There is a banal collision of Russian firms over their spheres of interest and budgetary resources. A number of well-known firms currently sense a dangerous competitor in NIIDAR and do not want to permit this institute to have a hand in matters of radar rearmament of the Russian Army. But one can compete in this manner, as they say, to the point of ruin. It is clear that someone has not learned from our country's history. They forgot how, as a result of bureaucratic games, the Red Army was left on the eve of the Second World War without automatic rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and much else besides. God forbid if we are forced in a possible aerospace war to remain without a reliable radar field. Thus the words of Chief Designer of the first combat OTH-R systems Franz Alexandrovich Kuzminsky regarding the state's defensive capacity have not lost their relevance. He began a difficult scientific-design search for the creation of much-needed radar weapons for the country. Current specialists at NIIDAR have continued his work. Russia today has over-the-horizon radars capable of detecting and warning of possible aerospace threats. And to Franz Kuzminsky himself, due honor must be given by the state for his selfless scientific labor.

With this, my eighteen-year journalistic investigation into the tragedy and triumph of the combat OTH-R system and its chief designer concludes. Once again, all the materials obtained, often with great difficulty, are packed into an old portfolio. This book will arouse genuine interest in some readers, and on the contrary, rage and irritation in others. Perhaps I have inadvertently made certain errors in technical terminology. I ask forgiveness for this. One thing I will say: I have attempted honestly to understand the history of the combat OTH-R system and to show what remarkable people, true professionals, created it.